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ABSTRACT

Initial coin offerings (ICOs) are a new form of fundraising
whereby blockchain-related ventures raise public capital in
exchange for newly issued digital tokens. In recent years, ICOs

have been a prominent focus of legal and economic studies, which
analyze their characteristics and determinants of their success.

In this Article, we systematically review these studies and identify
key ICO success factors. We then offer theoreticalexplanationsfor
our findings, and in certain cases, connect the empirical results
with the IPO and crowdfunding literatures. The results of our
analysis are important for two reasons. First, there is no single
formal data source, and there is evidence of inconsistenciesacross

the different data sources available. Second, our results show in
what circumstancesICO investors and initiatorsbehave like IPO
investors and initiators,and hence contribute to the literatureon
tokens as securities. In the second part of this Article, based on
our analysis, we show that a high degree of information
asymmetry exists in ICOs, identify three sources of informational
asymmetries, and discuss the role of signaling theory and rating

websites in mitigatingthese asymmetries. Finally, we discuss the
regulatory implications of our

findings, and propose specific

disclosure requirements tailored to ICOs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Initial coin offerings (ICOs) are a new form of fundraising whereby
blockchain-related ventures raise public capital in exchange for newly

issued digital tokens. The issued tokens may represent a variety of
rights, ranging from financial rights, such as dividend and voting
rights, to consumptive rights, such as the right to access a service or a
product that the issuer will provide. After the fundraising ends, the
issued tokens are generally traded on the secondary market.
ICOs have quickly emerged as a popular fundraising method.
While the idea of an ICO was first applied in 2013,' by 2017, over $10
billion was raised by over one thousand firms, 2 and by October 2018,
over $21 billion was raised by over three thousand firms. 3 This rapid
growth can be explained by various factors. From investors'
perspectives, cryptocurrencies are perceived as a "hedge against
volatile local currencies and geopolitical risk," and their growth might
be related to a continuing distrust in the traditional banking sector
since the 2008 financial crises. 4 Additionally, growing media

1.
See Laura Shin, Here's The Man Who Created ICOs And This Is The New
Token
He's
Backing,
FORBES
(Sept.
21,
2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2017/09/21/heres-the-man-who-created-icosand-this-is-the-new-token-hes-backing/#7ec40f611839
[https://perma.cc/RKE9-2TPT]
(archived Nov. 10, 2019) (discussing the background surrounding the creation of the first
ICO).
2.
See
ICO
Market
Analysis
2018,
ICOBENCH
4,
https://icobench.com/reports/ICOMarketAnalysis_2018.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/G7JZ-LR9B] (archived Nov. 8, 2019) (providing quantitative data
related to ICOs for 2017 and 2018).
3.
See Paul P. Momtaz, Kathrin Rennertseder & Henning Schr6der, Token
Offerings: A Revolution in CorporateFinance?, 49 CAPcO INST. J. FIN. TRANSFORMATION

32, 33 (2019) (describing "the evolution of the token offering market.").
4.
Ryan Clements, Assessing the Evolution of Cryptocurrency: Demand Factors,
Latent Value, and Regulatory Developments, 8 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV.
73, 78 (2018).
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attention, 5 combined with astronomic returns for early investors-with
6
returns on investment (ROIs) exceeding fifty thousand percent -have
attracted investor interest. From ventures' perspectives, an ICO is an
attractive alternative source of funding, because it may reduce
transaction costs compared to traditional financing methods, it has a
global outreach, and it enables ventures to establish a customer base
7

during the fundraising.
Despite their rapid growth, many aspects of ICOs remain unclear.
First, the terminology around the ICO phenomenon is yet unsettled
and different scholars and regulators tend to use different terms for
identical concepts. Second, very few studies analyze the valuation of
ICOs, which therefore remains unclear. Third, tokens vary
dramatically in their nature. They may represent a wide range of
rights, from financial rights to consumptive rights, and hence their
regulatory status is unclear. Complicating matters further, various
jurisdictions have adopted a range of approaches, from banning ICOs
to a crypto-friendly approach. Against that background, empirical and
theoretical studies have analyzed various issues related to ICOs, trying
to reduce the uncertainty associated with the market. This Article
contributes to the growing literature on ICOs by providing thorough
analysis of two specific key areas: determinants of ICO success and
information asymmetry.
Determinants of ICO success. Since its boom in 2017, the ICO
phenomenon has attracted legal and economic empirical studies, which
8
have analyzed determinants of ICO success. Their findings have often
been inconsistent, however. One possible reason is that there are no
official data sources, and there is evidence of inconsistencies across

&

See id. at 75 (introducing media attention as one of the factors driving
5.
unprecedented growth in the cryptocurrencies market during 2017).
See Coin and Crypto, Early Investors are Making 50,000% Returns on ICOs,
6.
HACKER NOON (Dec. 3, 2017), hackernoon.com/investors-are-making-50-000-returns-onicos-32432bc741d1 [https://perma.cc/E68G-CXBB] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (introducing
the concept of ICO and its return on investment trends); Top 10 ICOs with the Biggest
ROI, COINTELEGRAPH, cointelegraph.com/ico-101/top-10-icos-with-the-biggest-roi#10qtum--9225-roi (last visited Nov. 8, 2019) [https://perma.cc/PPU6-AE6V] (archived Nov.
10, 2019) (explaining that 2017 was a very profitable year for ICOs and introducing the
most successful ICO campaigns at the time of publication).
See Saman Adhami, Giancarlo Giudici & Stefano Martinazzi, Why Do
7.
Businesses Go Crypto?An EmpiricalAnalysis of Initial Coin Offerings, 100 J. ECON.
BUS. 64, 65 (2018) (setting forth the reasons why the increasing success of ICOs is
relevant to business activity); Jiri Chod & Evgeny Lyandres, A Theory of ICOs:
Diversification, Agency, and Information Asymmetry 3 (July 18, 2018) (unpublished
author),
(on
file
with
manuscript)
28
[https://perma.cc/ZV8Vhttps://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=31595
TQTY] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (arguing that ICOs are the preferred source of financing
for under-diversified venture capital investors when the venture payoff is highly
uncertain, because ICO financing increases the entrepreneurs' options to retain cash and
increase the required return).
See infra Part III.
8.
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various data sources. 9 To address this, the Article provides an overview
of the empirical literature. It aggregates empirical studies using
different data sources and methodologies to identify factors that affect
ICO success. Subsequently, it compares the results with empirical
studies in the context of initial public offerings (IPOs) and

crowdfunding,
findings.

and then offers theoretical

explanations for the

The results in this part are important for two reasons. First, by
combining empirical results from a large number of empirical studies,
using different data sources and methodologies, this Article provides a

comprehensive and accurate meta-analysis of factors that affect ICOs.
This analysis is especially important given the absence of a formal data
source. Second, this Article compares determinants of ICO success with
determinants of IPO success, and thus shows in what circumstances
ICO investors and initiators behave like IPO investors and initiators.' 0

As such, it contributes to the literature that discusses the classification
of tokens as securities.
Information asymmetry. The second part of the analysis focuses
on information asymmetry. Information asymmetry is one of the most
important sources of market friction. It is a condition associated with
financial markets, wherein potential investors lack information
required to assess the true quality of the financial product. it
Potentially, this may create a market for lemons, where high-quality

9.
See Evgeny Lyandres, Berardino Palazzo & Daniel Rabetti, Do Tokens
Behave Like Securities? An Anatomy of Initial Coin Offerings 9 (Apr. 2019) (unpublished
manuscript)
(on
file
with
SSRN),
[https://perma.cc/EU5Uhttps://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3287583
FCEU] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (documenting substantial inconsistencies across data
sources-especially for the following variables: amount raised, hard cap, the number of
tokens available for sale, and the overall number of project-related tokens issued);
Lauren Rhue, Trust is All You Need: An Empirical Exploration of Initial Coin Offerings
(ICOs) and ICO Reputation Scores 23 (May 16, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
SSRN),
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3179723
with
[https://perma.cc/92QH-P7Z6] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (finding that reputation scores
arp inconsistent across different data sources).
For a similar approach, see generally Lyandres et al., supra note 9, at 7-30
10.
(comparing ICOs data to typical securities' outcomes to determine whether ICOs should
be deemed a type of securities for regulatory purposes).
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
11.
ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 35455 (1976) (discussing the value of monitoring tools as a source of information to investors
and its potential reflection on portfolio returns); Paul P. Momtaz, Entrepreneurial
Finance and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Token Offerings 6-7 (Apr. 4, 2019)
(unpublished
manuscript)
(on
file
with
author),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=3343912
[https://perma.cc/G6HGGX29] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) [hereinafter Moral Hazard] (discussing the effect of
information asymmetry in token sales).
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12
Following a
companies will be deterred from entering the market.
13
venture capitalists
growing body of literature in the context of IPOs,
(VC), 14 and crowdfunding, 15 recent empirical studies document
significant evidence for information asymmetry and poor disclosure in
the ICO realm.
Against that background, this Article outlines three sources of
informational asymmetries-the absence of standard disclosure
requirements, investors' lack of fundamental technical knowledge, and

16
projects' early stages of development during the offering -and

discusses the role of signaling theory and rating websites in mitigating
these asymmetries.
Signaling Theory examines how high-quality ventures can
distinguish themselves from low-quality firms by sending signals
17
Given the severe information
about the venture's true quality.
asymmetry associated with the market, coupled with the high
variation in ICOs' quality, the Article argues that high-quality ICOs
are incentivized to send signals about the true quality of ventures, and
examines whether they can signal quality through voluntary
disclosure and technological capabilities. The analysis presented in
this Article suggests that the effect of providing more extensive
information in white papers is unclear, which implies that the
effectiveness of signaling in mitigating informational asymmetries in
the ICO context is limited.
Rating websites study ICOs and make recommendations on their
tokens. Considering the information asymmetry associated with the

See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertaintyand the
12.
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 488 (1970) (introducing the issue of a decreased
average quality of products and size of the market in those markets which use market
statistics to determine the quality of future purchases).
See, e.g., Boyd D. Cohen & Thomas J. Dean, Information Asymmetry and
13.
Investor Valuation of IPOs: Top Management Team Legitimacy as a Capital Market
Signal, 26 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 683, 683-85 (2005) (introducing the issues created by
information asymmetry in the IPO context).
See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons
14.
from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1076-78 (2003) (highlighting the
role of information asymmetry in venture capital investments that involve technology
and cutting-edge science).
See, e.g., Gerrit K.C. Ahlers, Douglas Cumming, Christina Gunther & Denis
15.
Schweizer, Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding, 39 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC.
955, 959 (2015) (discussing how information asymmetry between investors and
entrepreneurs in the crowdfunding context may result in a lack of funding for highperforming ventures).
These sources were initially identified by Christian Fisch. See Christian
16.
Fisch, Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) to Finance New Ventures, 34 J. BUS. VENTURING 1,
6 (2019); see also Moral Hazard, supra note 11, at 6-7 (exploring the sources of
information asymmetry in the context of token sales).
See Brian L. Connelly, S. Trevis Certo, R. Duane Ireland & Christopher R.
17.
Reutzel, Signaling Theory: A Review and Assessment, 37 J. MGMT. 39, 40 (2011)
(providing examples of the use of the signaling theory across different spectrums,
including, for example, recruiting or corporate governance).
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play

a vital

intermediary role. The absence of traditional underwriters-who play
a critical intermediary role in the IPO market 18-coupled with the
complexity of this new technology, increase the demand for
information. Analysts may screen ICOs' information disclosure and
signaling and make it more accessible to unsophisticated investors, for
whom conducting due diligence on each ICO might be too costly.
However, the Article demonstrates major drawbacks with regard to

their ratings, such as inconsistency, inaccuracy, and lack of reference
to the source code-which is the de facto business model of the project.
Therefore, the Article argues that the effectiveness of analyst rating in
mitigating the information asymmetry associated with the market is
limited as well.
These findings suggest that ICO investors are not entirely
rational, and hence that we cannot fully rely on the competitive forces
of an economy in this case. Therefore, the Article argues that
regulators should address the sources of informational asymmetries
discussed in this Article-which are a source of investors'
irrationality-by mandatory disclosure provisions. To this end, based
on the empirical analysis, this Article proposes specific disclosure
requirements tailored to the unique characteristics of ICOs. By doing
so, this Article contributes to the discussion on optimal ICO regulation.
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part II
provides a comprehensive overview of the foundations of blockchain

and ICOs. Part III provides an analysis of the empirical literature
related to ICO characteristics. The first subpart presents a brief
overview of the market, and the subsequent subparts analyze the
association between ICO characteristics and success. Part IV focuses

on information asymmetry; it discusses three sources of informational
asymmetries and examines the role of signaling theory and rating

websites in mitigating these asymmetries. Part V discusses the
regulatory implications of the findings of this study and proposes
specific disclosure requirements tailored to ICOs.

18. See Jongsub Lee, Tao Li & Donghwa Shin, The Wisdom of Crowds and
Information Cascades in FinTech: Evidence from Initial Coin Offerings 1, 6-7, 16, 27
(May
2018)
(unpublished
manuscript)
(on
file
with
author),
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfrfbank-research-conference/annual-18th/17li.pdf [https://perma.cc/BAL2-82CG] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (introducing the role of
underwriters in IPOs and contrasting it to the operational framework surrounding
ICOs).

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OFTRANSNATIONAL LAW

532

II.

[VOL.53:525

AN OVERVIEW OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF BLOCKCHAIN AND ICOS

The terminology around blockchain technology is yet unsettled
and hence often confusing. Different scholars and regulators tend to
use different terms for identical concepts.19 To avoid inconsistency, as
a preliminary matter, the Article provides a general overview of the
fundamental terms associated with the blockchain phenomenon. The

technical aspects of blockchain and cryptocurrencies

will not be

discussed in greater detail in the Article, since they are not necessary
to understand the main arguments developed in the Article.
A. Blockchain
Blockchain is a decentralized database hosted by a network of
computers (called nodes)2 0 that communicate with each other via the
internet.2 1 It is generally used to track and record the ownership
information about any asset to which a unique identifier can be

See Angela Walch, The Path of the Blockchain Lexicon (and the Law), 36 REV.
19.
BANKING & FIN. L. 713, 728-35 (2017) (describing the inconsistency associated with the
blockchain's underlying vocabulary and suggesting that it reflects the uncertainty
around this new phenomenon); Juri Mattila, The Blockchain Phenomenon: The
Disruptive Potential of Distributed Consensus Architectures 2 (Res. Inst. of the Finnish
Econ. (ETLA), Working Paper No. 38, 2016), www.etla.fi/wp-content/uploads/ETLAWorking-Papers-38.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3S8-8FRN] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (stating
that "the terminology around the whole phenomenon is still heavily in flux"); see also
APOLLINE BLANDIN ET AL., CAMBRIDGE CENT. FOR ALT. FIN., GLOBAL CRYPTOASSET
REGULATORY
LANDSCAPE
STUDY
15
(2019),

https://www.jbs.cam. ac.uk/fileadmin/user-upload/research/centres/alternativefinance/downloads/2019-04-ccaf-global-cryptoasset-regulatory-landscape-study.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D8E3-Z9PE] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (explaining that lack of clear
terminology in the cryptoasset and blockchain technology functions as an impediment to
policy-making initiatives).
20.
See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., DISCUSSION PAPER DP17/3: DISCUSSION PAPER ON
DISTRIBUTED
LEDGER
TECHNOLOGY
10
(Apr.
2017),

[https://perma.cc/L263-4AVK]
www.fca.org.uk/publication/discussion/dp17-03.pdf
(archived Nov. 10, 2019) (defining nodes as "participants on a distributed ledger.
Different nodes may have different rights to read, write and/or delete data.").
21.
For a general overview of blockchain technology, see Randolph A. Robinson
II, The New Digital Wild West: Regulating the Explosion of Initial Coin Offerings, 85
TENN. L. REV. 897, 908-919 (2018) (explaining what is the blockchain and how it works);
Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the
Rise of Lex Cryptographia 4-8 (Mar. 12, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
Internet

Governance

Forum),

https://www.intgovforum.org/cms/wks20l5/uploads/proposal_backgroundpaper/SSRNid2580664.pdf [https://perma.cc/39MS-YV6E] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (providing an
overview on the concept and importance of blockchain technology). For a comprehensive
overview of the technological aspects of blockchain, see ARVIND NARAYANAN, JOSEPH
BONNEAU, EDWARD FELTEN, ANDREW MILLER & STEVEN GOLDFEDER, BITCOIN AND
CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGIES: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION (2016).
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issued.2 2 The asset itself can be either digital or physical. 23 For
example, a unique cryptocurrency (identifier) that represents a
physical car can be issued on top of the blockchain, enabling
independent parties to track and transfer their ownership.

The blockchain itself is designed as a peer-to-peer network that is
neither maintained by a central entity nor located at a specific physical

location. 2 4 Instead, a copy of the database is stored on every computer
in the network and all copies are updated simultaneously after any
addition to the database. 25 To ensure that all copies are updated
identically, the system relies on inherent incentives that shape the
nodes' behavior.2 6

The process of adding new data to the shared database is governed
by a predefined protocol (known as a consensus mechanism) which

defines "(1) how information is added to a blockchain; and (2) how
disparate members of a blockchain-based network come to periodic
agreement about the current state of the shared database." 27 This

protocol allows anyone to add to the shared database, and at the same
time, ensures that the newly added information is valid. 28
Regarding its structure, the blockchain is comprised of blocks
which contain, inter alia, a data record (for example, a set of
transactions), and each block contains a reference to the previous one:
Together, the blocks form a chain that consists of all the transactions

22.
See Mattila, supra note 19, at 10 (explaining blockchain technology
capabilities, and in particular, the ability to create records of ownership).
23.
See id. (emphasizing blockchain technology's ability to create records of
ownership regarding both digital and physical assets).
24.
See Marco Iansiti & Karim R. Lakhani, The Truth About Blockchain, 2017
HARV.
BUS.
REV.
118,
https://hbr.org/2017/01/the-truth-about-blockchain
[https://perma.cc/2UWU-6X24] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (comparing blockchain to
technology underlying e-mail exchange); Robinson II, supra note 2121, at 911
(introducing the costs connected to centralized intermediaries in the traditional system
through an example).
25.
See Iansiti & Lakhani, supra note 24 (explaining how blockchain functions),;
Wright & De Filippi, supra note 21, at 6-7 (describing blockchain as "a chronological
database of transactions recorded by a network of computers. . .. [and] stored on every
in computer in the network . .. [which] periodically synchronize to . . . have the same
shared database.").
26.
See Shaanan Cohney, David Hoffman, Jeremy Sklaroff & David Wishnick,
Coin-Operated Capitalism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 591, 602 (2019) (clarifying that
blockchain technology does not need to rely on the trustworthiness of actors within the
system because it relies "on economic incentives and code-based controls" modelling the
network's behavior).
27.
Jonathan Rohr & Aaron Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin
Offerings, and the Democratizationof Public CapitalMarkets, 70 HASTING L. J. 463, 47071 (2019).
28.
See Mattila, supra note 19, at 10 (introducing the benefits of applying
blockchain technology to financial instruments, asset registries, and marketplaces).
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in a specific network.2 9 Once a new block is added to the chain (the
30
shared database), it becomes "immutable and censorship-resistant."

The links between the blocks make it (nearly) impossible to alter newly

added data.
The blockchain can be designed as either permissioned/private or

permissionless/public.

31

Permissioned blockchains act as closed and

private ecosystems, "where users are not freely able to join the
network."3 2 Instead, predefined permissions are set to control who can
access the database, execute the consensus mechanism, or maintain
the database (store a copy of the database). Conversely, in
33
all users have equal
permissionless blockchains, such as bitcoin,
rights: everyone can submit transactions, maintain the database, and
34
participate in the validation process.

See Rohr & Wright, supra note 27, at 471 (discussing the concept of proof of
29.
work and its role in altering data within a blockchain-based mechanism).
Mattila, supra note 19, at 10.
30.
See generally Elyes Ben Hamida, Kei Leo Brousmiche, Hugo Levard & Eric
31.
Thea, Blockchain for Enterprise: Overview, Opportunities and Challenges, in ICWMC,
THE

THIRTEENTH

INTERNATIONAL

CONFERENCE

ON

WIRELESS

AND

MOBILE

COMMUNICATIONs 83, 86 (Carlos Becker Westphall et al. eds., 2017) (describing the
successful use of blockchain technology in data exchanges and processes automation);
Vitalik Buterin, On Public and Private Blockchains, ETHEREUM BLOG (Aug. 6, 2015),
blog.Ethereum.org/2015/08/07/on-public-and-private-blockchains/
[https://perma.cc/2FWW-EGSF] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (introducing "three categories
of blockchain-like database applications": public, consortium, and fully private, and
explaining their characteristics).
Daniel Dob, Permissioned vs Permissionless Blockchains: Understanding the
32.
Differences, BLOCKONOMI (July 17, 2018), https://blockonomi.com/permissioned-vspermissionless-blockchains/ [https://perma.cc/JKW9-H4QD] (archived Nov. 10, 2019).
Permissioned/private blockchains can generally be classified into two categories: private
and consortium blockchains. The distinction between the two lies primarily in the
governance scheme; while in private blockchains one authority governs the whole
system, in consortium blockchains the authority is shared among different parties. See
Buterin, supra note 31 (enumerating the distinguishing features of each privacy setting);
Hamida et al., supra note 311, at 93 ("[i]n private chains, one participant rules the whole
system whereas members of consortium blockchains share the authority among them.").
For the sake of simplicity, this Article assumes that the term permissioned/private
blockchain encompasses both categories.
For more information, see Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer
33.
Electronic Cash System, BITcOIN (2008), bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/KN8UFTYY] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (introducing the Bitcoin system and its functionality).
For a comparison between permissioned and permissionless blockchains, see
34.
Hamida et al., supra note 31, at 94 (highlighting differences in blockchain architecture
between public and private blockchain, including differences in data structure, network
and privacy, security and scalability, forks and responsiveness, and forks and updates);
see also Zibin Zheng et al., An Overview of Blockchain Technology: Architecture,
Consensus, and Future Trends, in IEEE, INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON BIG DATA 557,

559-60 (2017) (comparing a number of items among the three categories of blockchainlike database applications); Praveen Jayachandran, The Difference Between Public and
Private
Blockchain,
IBM
THINK
BLOG
(May
31,
2017),
www.ibm.com/blogs/blockchain/2017/05/the-difference-between-public-and-privateblockchain/ [https://perma.cc/7SPY-S2JB] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (addressing
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B. Smart Contracts
A smart contract is a self-execution

agreement written in a

computer code that can be utilized on blockchain technology. 3 5 The
smart contract concept was first proposed by Nick Szabo in 1997,36

years before the invention of the blockchain. 37 Szabo envisioned that
many kinds of contractual agreements can be embedded into software
codes and performed automatically, without human intervention. 38 His
primary example was the vending machine:
[A] vending machine performs two critical functions. First, it directly effectuates
performance by taking in money and . . . [dispensing] products. Second, it
incorporates enough security to make the cost of breach (breaking into the
machine) exceed the potential rewards. For all practical purposes, the vending
39
machine is the entire contractual environment for its transactions.

Szabo's ideas were ahead of their time and remained isolated from

the e-commerce world for years.4 0 That, however, has changed with the
development of the blockchain. The blockchain allowed independent
parties to "confirm that an event or condition has in fact occurred

similarities and distinctions of public and private blockchains); Mattila, supra note 19,
at 7-8 (defining permissioned and permissionless ledgers).
35.
For a discussion on the legal implications of smart contracts, see Karen E.C.
Levy, Book-Smart, Not Street-Smart: Blockchain-Based Smart Contracts and the Social
Workings of Law, 3 ENGAGING SCI., TECH. & Soc'Y. 1, 2 (2017) (describing the
relationship between smart contracts and blockchain); Reggie O'Shields, Smart
Contracts: Legal Agreements for the Blockchain, 21 N.C. BANKING INST. 177, 177-78
(2017) (describing the potential merits of smart contracts); Max Raskin, The Law and
Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 GEo. L. TECH. REV. 305, 309-11 (2017) (providing a
definition of smart contract); Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina,
67 DUKE L.J. 314, 330-38 (2017) (discussing possible applications of this technology to
present business models).
36.
See
Nick
Szabo,
The
Idea
of
Smart
Contracts
(1997),
www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwinter
school2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/idea.html [https://perma.cc/P8SB-G79Z] (archived Nov.
10, 2019) (discussing the possibility of adding embedded contracts to valuable property
capable of being controlled through digital means, as a security measure against use of
the property by a non-owner).
37.
See O'Shields, supra note 35, at 179 (suggesting that the appearance of
blockchain technology has revitalized the concept of smart contracts). For a primer on
the evolution of digital agreements, see Werbach & Cornell, supra note 35, at 320-24.
38.
See Nick Szabo, Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks,
FIRST MONDAY (Sept. 1, 1997), https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/548
[https://perma.c/4KYR-Q4AV] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (introducing the idea that
contractual clauses can be embedded into hardware and software equipped in purchased
goods to make subsequent breaches of contract expensive to the breacher).
39.
Id.; Werbach & Cornell, supra note 35, at 323.
40.
See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 35, at 324 (explaining that Szabo's ideas
were only embraced by "cypherpunks").
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41
without the need for a third party," and thus it enabled the creation
42
It allowed independent parties "to
of enforceable smart contracts.
coordinate their actions and trust that their commitments to each
other will be fulfilled."4 3 This development gave rise to new uses of
smart contracts4 4 and attracted significant attention from both
academic and industrial researchers.
Another important development in the evolution of smart
contracts is the creation of the Ethereum platform. Ethereum is a
decentralized blockchain founded in 2014 with the goal of "allowing
anyone to write smart contracts and decentralized applications where
they can create their own arbitrary rules for ownership, transaction
45
To this end, Ethereum has
formats and state transition functions."
developed a programming language that enabled the creation of
46
Using Ethereum's programming
sophisticated smart contracts.
language, ventures could create their own digital tokens-which can
be assigned with various rights (e.g., economic, voting, and
consumptive rights)-and offer them to the public through an ICO

&

Wright & De Filippi, supra note 21, at 10.
41.
See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 35, at 33 (describing how Bitcoin works
42.
as a guarantee mechanism, completing Szabo's conception of smart contracts as a
security device).
43.
Id.
For example, smart contracts have been created to automatically execute
44.
financial derivatives. See Wright & De Filippi, supra note 21, at 11 & n.51 ("smart
contracts have mostly been created to automatically execute derivatives, futures, swaps,
and options."); see also Jesus Rodriguez, The Programmable Short: Four Crypto
Derivative Protocols You Should Know About, HACKER NOON (Oct. 14, 2019),
https://hackernoon.com/the-programmable-short-four-crypto-derivative-protocols-youshould-know-about-b0b4ecad9e95 [https://perma.cc/3XJR-C8KC] (archived Nov. 10,
2019 (discussing the use of smart contracts in programmable derivatives). Smart
contracts have also been created to facilitate the sale of goods and services between
independent parties on the Internet without the need for a centralized middleman. See
How does OpenBazaar work?, OPEN BAZzAR, https://openbazaar.zendesk.com/hc/en(last visited Nov. 9, 2019)
us/articles/207982443-How-does-OpenBazaar-work
[https://perma.cc/S6P4-QXY9] (archived Nov 10, 2019) (explaining the use of online
commerce software designed to avoid the middleman); Wright & De Filippi, supra note
21, at 11 (highlighting the versatility of smart contracts). Finally, smart contracts allow
musicians to automatically collect royalties on their songs each time they are
downloaded.
See
generally
Frequently Asked
Questions,
UJO
MUSIc,
https://ujomusic.com/faq (last visited Nov. 9, 2019) [https://perma.cc/ZT4B-CBS4]
(archived Nov. 10, 2019).
Vitalik Buterin, Ethereum White Paper:A Next GenerationSmart Contract
45.
13
(2013),
BLOG
ETHEREUM
Platform,
Application
Decentralized
http://blockchainlab.com/pdf/Ethereumwhitepapera_next_generationsmart_contractanddecentralizedapplicationplatform-vitalikbuterin.pdf [https://perma.cc/85C6-ER4M] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) [hereinafter Buterin,
Ethereum Paper].
See Wright & De Filippi, supra note 21, at 12 (describing a number of open
46.
source projects that have contributed to the evolution of smart contracts).
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(through the use of smart contrasts), thus bypassing traditional VCs
and the process of an IPO. 47
C. Cryptocurrencies, Coins, DigitalCurrencies, and Tokens
The vocabulary used to describe the different currencies
associated with the blockchain is confusing. There are "virtual
currencies,"
"digital currencies,"
"crypto-coins," "crypto-assets,"
"tokens," etc. 48 This subpart explains what cryptocurrencies are and
provides an overview of different types of cryptocurrencies and tokens.

1. What are Cryptocurrencies?
Cryptocurrency is basically a digital representation of value that
can be transmitted through the network that hosts it. MerriamWebster defines cryptocurrency as "any form of currency that only
exists digitally, that usually has no central issuing or regulating
authority but instead uses a decentralized system to record
transactions and manage the issuance of new units, and that relies on
cryptography to prevent counterfeiting and fraudulent transactions."4 9
Cryptocurrencies typically function as a medium of exchange by
certain parties on a certain network, and their value is normally
determined by market supply and demand.
The main differences between a cryptocurrency and a fiat
currency are as follows. First, unlike fiat currencies that can be printed
by central banks, cryptocurrencies are created in accordance with a
predefined computer protocol. 50 Second, cryptocurrencies typically run
on a decentralized network, which means that there is no central
authority that governs it.5 1 No central authority can manipulate the
supply of Bitcoins, for example. Third, in contrast to fiat currencies-

47.
See Robinson H, supra note 21, at 920 (discussing the ability of developers to
create new investment by issuing their own crypto-tokens); Rohr & Wright, supra note
27, at 474 (introducing the concept of application tokens).
48.
BLANDIN ET AL., supra note 19; Walch, supra note 19, at 721.
49.

Cryptocurrency,

MERRIAM-WEBSTER

(2019),

https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/cryptocurrency [https://perma.cc/9XYP-WV9Z] (archived Nov.
10, 2019).
50.
See Virtuelle Wdhrunger [Virtual Currency (VC)], BUNDEsANsTALT FOR
FINANZDIENSTLEISTUNGSAUFSICHT
(BAFIN)
[FEDERAL
FINANCIAL
SUPERVISORY
AUTHORITY],
trans.
(Apr.
28,
2016),
www.bafin.de/EN/Aufsicht/FinTech/VirtualCurrency/virtualcurrencynode_en.html
[https://perma.cc/942Q-8W64) (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (defining virtual currency).
51. See Dong He et al., Virtual Currenciesand Beyond: Initial Considerations9,
SND/16/03
(Jan.
2016),
https://www.jdcoin.us/images/sdnl603.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LR8Z-FC2H] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (describing virtual currency's
cryptography techniques, which include a decentralized administration framework).
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is backed by the creditworthiness of central banks and

governments-the value of cryptocurrencies typically derive "solely
52
from the expectation that others would also value and use them."
Fourth, the records of cryptocurrency ownership on top of the
53
blockchain are encrypted (hence their name).
money, which
also different from
are
Cryptocurrencies
traditionally serves as a medium of exchange, a unit of account, and a
store of value. 54 While cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ether act as a
medium of exchange between certain parties, their fluctuating demand
and inflexible supply impede their ability to serve as an adequate store
of value. 55 Additionally, it is arguable that most cryptocurrencies
cannot serve as a unit of account, because they "do not measure the
value of goods and services directly; they represent the value of goods
56
and services measured in fiat currency based on an exchange rate."
Furthermore, since a cryptocurrency does not represent a
monetary claim against a legal entity, it is also different from
electronic money, defined in the E-Money Directive, Art. 2(2) as
"electronically, including magnetically, stored monetary value as
represented by a claim on the issuer which is issued on receipt of funds
57
for the purpose of making payment transactions."

52.
53.

Id.
See

id.

(arguing that most

virtual

currency

systems

are "pseudo-

anonymous.").

.

See id. at 17 (studying, inter alia, whether cryptocurrencies fulfill the
54.
economic roles associated with money and concluding that they currently do not); see
also David Yermack, Is Bitcoin a Real Currency? An Economic Appraisal 1, 4 (Nat'l
2013),
19747,
No.
Paper
Working
Res.,
Econ.
of
Bureau
https://www.nber.org/papers/w19747.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3DH-CV8T] (archived Nov.
10, 2019) (examining whether bitcoin performs the functions of money and concluding
that it "behave[s] more like a speculative investment than a currency"). See generally
Saifedean Ammous, Can Cryptocurrencies Fulfil the Functions of Money?, 70 Q. REV.
ECON. & FIN. 38 (2018) (analyzing the monetary characteristics of five cryptocurrencies
to assess whether they can fulfil the functions of money).
See Iris M. Barsan, Legal Challenges of Initial Coin Offerings (ICO), 3 REV.
55.
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT FIN. 54, 57 (2017) (arguing that the "high price volatility" of
cryptocurrencies hinders their ability to serve as a store of value); Ammous, supra note
54, at 50 (concluding that fluctuating demand and inflexible supply make cryptocurrency
an inadequate unit of account); He et al., supra note 51, at 17 (discussing high price
volatility of virtual currencies); Yermack, supra note 54, at 13-18 (comparing Bitcoin's
performance as a store of value to the performance of other currencies and concluding
that its excessive volatility is more consistent with a speculative investment than a
currency).
Barsan, supra note 55, at 57; see also He et al., supra note 51, at 17
56.
(discounting the ability of virtual currency to currently operate as an independent unit
of account).
Council Directive 2009/110, art. 2(2), 2009 O.J. (L267) 7 (EC); see Philipp
57.
Hacker & Chris Thomale, Crypto-Securities Regulation: ICOs, Token Sales and
Cryptocurrenciesunder EU Financial Law, 15 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 645, pincite
(arguing that currency tokens are in different from electronic money because currency
tokens do not embody a claim to pay)
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2. A Technical Classification of Cryptocurrencies-Coins and Tokens

From a technical perspective, cryptocurrencies can be divided into
coins and tokens (or, alternatively, protocol tokens and app tokens). 58
The difference between the two is that coins run on an independent

blockchain, whereas tokens are built on an existing blockchain. In the
former, the underlying blockchain platform is primarily designed to
create and transfer the coin, and the coin is generally being used "to
compensate parties for participation in some activity that contributes
to the maintenance of the blockchain and its network."5 9 Examples are

Bitcoin-which was designed to act as a "purely peer-to-peer version of
electronic cash [that] would allow online payments to be sent directly
from one party to another without going through a financial
institution"6 0-and Ether.
Unlike coins-which run on an independent blockchain-tokens
reside on top of another blockchain, most prominently on the Ethereum
blockchain. 6 1 Tokens tend to have more specific objectives compared to
coins, and they are typically intended to be used solely on their
platforms. 62 Coins, on the other hand, often can be used as a means of
payment for goods or services outside the platform. 63 For example, in
the Ethereum ICO, investors offered bitcoin and received Ether in
return. 64
Understanding the nature of the Ethereum platform may help to
understand the differences between coins and tokens. Ethereum is a
decentralized blockchain founded in 2014.65 Unlike Bitcoin, which was
designed to provide a platform for cryptocurrencies exchange, the
Ethereum platform was created with the goal of "allowing anyone to
write smart contracts and decentralized applications where they can
create their own arbitrary rules for ownership, transaction formats and
state
transition
functions." 66
Using
smart
contracts,
any

entrepreneur-including

unexperienced

software

developers-can

58.
See Rohr & Wright, supra note 27, at 470-85 (discussing the characteristics
of protocol and app tokens).
59.
Id. at 470.
60.
Nakamoto, supra note 33, at 1.
61.
See infra Part III.C.1.
62.
See Rohr & Wright, supra note 27, at 475 (comparing protocol tokens to app
tokens, and declaring the latter as more specific and narrow).
63.
See Hacker & Thomale, supra note 57 (explaining that tokens can be used to
pay for items that are outside the platform).
64.
See id. (discussing currency tokens).
65.
For an overview of the Ethereum platform, see Robinson II, supra note 21, at
919-24.
66.
Buterin, Ethereum Paper, supra note 45, at 13.
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create on top of the Ethereum blockchain a new token that can be
67
assigned financial, voting, participation, and consumptive rights.
To facilitate the process of creating new tokens on top of the
Ethereum blockchain, Ethereum has created the ERC20, a "token
standard [that] describes the functions and events that an Ethereum
68
token contract has to implement." The ERC20 simplifies the process
of issuing a new token, enabling anyone to issue a new token using less
69
Additionally, it ensures the
than one hundred lines of code.
interoperability of different tokens; tokens issued under this protocol
can interact with smart contracts on the Ethereum platform and with
70
every wallet that supports Ethereum-based tokens.
Back to coins and tokens: Ether acts as the "main internal crypto71
fuel of Ethereum, and is used to pay transaction fees." Any operation
of smart contracts on top of the Ethereum blockchain requires a perfunction fee (called "gas") that must be paid using Ether. 72 As such,
Ether is a coin (or a protocol token). It runs on a native blockchain
platform, it is used to fuel the platform, and it can be used as a means
of payment for goods or services outside the platform (for example, in
an ICO investors can buy new app tokens with Ether). The
cryptocurrencies that build on top of the Ethereum platform, on the
other hand, are tokens (or app tokens).
3. A Functional Classification of Cryptocurrencies-Digital Currencies
and Digital Tokens
Alternatively, cryptocurrencies can be divided into digital
currencies 73 and digital tokens based on the function they serve. This

See Rohr & Wright, supra note 277, at 474 & n.54 (explaining that smart
67.
contracts are a simple tool for software developers to create secure tokens with attached
rights).
ERC20, BITCOINWIKI, https://en.bitcoinwiki.org/wiki/ERC20 (last visited
68.
Nov. 7, 2019) [https://perma.cc/J4WU-PPNN] (archived Nov. 10, 2019); see also Amy
Castor, Ethereum 'Tokens' Are All the Rage. But What Are They Anyway?, COINDEsK
www.coindesk.com/Ethereums-erc-20-tokens-rage-anyway/
2017),
17,
(June
[https://perma.cc/4BNC-J2HV] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (explaining the "ERC20 token
standard" and its importance to developers working with tokens).
See Rohr & Write, supra note 27, at 474 (describing the "ERC20 token
69.
standard").
See Robinson II, supra note 21, at 958 & n.349 (declaring that most ICOs
70.
within Ethereum use the ERC20 standard and that specific safeguards could be included
in the protocol, operating across the board of ICOs).
Buterin, Ethereum Paper, supra note 45, at 13.
71.
See id. at 14 (describing "GASPRICE" as a fee that is paid per every
72.
computation step of code execution); see also Cohney et al., supra note 26, at 603
(explaining the operation of Ethereum as opposed to Bitcoin, and in particular its
payment of a "per-function fee").
Different regulators often use the terms "Digital Currency" and "Virtual
73.
Currency" interchangeably. To avoid inconsistency, in this Article, we will use the term
"Digital Currency."
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classification has been adopted by most regulators around the world, 74
and accordingly we have decided to use this classification in the Article.
In this classification, a digital token can be defined as "any digital
representation of an interest, which may be of value, a right to receive
a benefit or perform specified functions or may not have a specified

purpose or use." 75 And, on the other hand, a digital currency can be
defined as "a type of . .. [cryptocurrency] that is meant to be used as a
means of payment or exchange for goods or services that are external
to the . . . [blockchain] ecosystem on which they are built." 76 Examples
of digital currencies are Bitcoin and Ether. Both can be used by
potential investors to purchase tokens during ICOs, and hence they are
meant to function as a means of payment external to the platform. 77

4. Different Types of Tokens
The previous subparts explained what cryptocurrencies are and
what the differences between digital currencies and digital tokens are.
Against this background,

this subpart

examines the

differences

between different types of tokens. While tokens may represent a wide
range of rights, they generally can be divided
security and utility tokens. 78
Security tokens is a broad category that
grant their holders financial rights, such
rights; 79 debt-like rights-paying interest on

into two major categories:
consists of all tokens that
as dividends and voting
money and redeeming the

74.
For an overview, see generally BLANDIN ET AL., supra note 19 (performing a
comparative analysis of the regulatory landscapes of cryptocurrency).
75.
Advice: Initial Coin Offerings and Crypto-Assets, EUROPEAN SEC. & MKTS.
AUTH. 42 (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma50157-1391_cryptoadvice.pdf [https://perma.cc/T26S-DUK2] (archived Nov. 10, 2019).
76. Id. at 43 (ESMA uses this definition for the term "Payment-type cryptoasset").
77. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
78. For a similar classification, see Hacker & Thomale, supra note 57, n.48
(describing the traditional classification of tokens); see also Alexis Collomb et al.,
Blockchain Technology and Financial Regulation: A Risk-Based Approach to the
Regulation of ICOs, 10 EUR. J. RISK REG. 263, 279-81 (2019) (suggesting that tokens can
be divided into four groups: (1) utility tokens, which can be exchanged for goods or
services; (2) participation tokens, which give rights to participate in the governance of a
specific distributed process; (3) investment tokens, which give rights to financial returns,
based on the profits generated by a project; and (4) asset-backed tokens, which give
rights of ownership of an underlying asset).
79.
Some sources refer to security tokens as investment tokens. See, e.g., Collomb
et al., supra note 78, at 280-81; Rohr & Wright, supra note 27, at 476 ("investment
tokens-are different from utility tokens and are not only functional in nature but provide
holders with economic rights, such as a share of profits generated by a project or
organization.").
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debt after a certain period; 8 0 and under certain circumstances, tokens
81
or a right to
that represent ownership of an underlying asset,
participate in the cash flow generated by the underlying asset, for
example, real estate. 82 Another important characteristic of security
tokens is liquidity on the secondary market-the fact that a token is
traded on cryptocurrency exchanges with significant liquidity suggests
that the token is transferable and negotiable and thus bears
83
resemblance to securities.
Utility tokens, on the other hand, provide access to a service or a
product the issuer will provide. Unlike digital currencies, which act as
a means of payment that is external to the token platform, utility
tokens grant rights to a certain platform where the service is
provided. 8 4 Unlike most securities tokens, utility tokens generally do
not grant ownership rights. Utility tokens vary dramatically in their
nature and may therefore be divided into three subcategories as follows
(a token may, of course, comprise of elements from some or all these
subcategories):

See Barsan, supra note 55, at 58 (discussing that tokens can incorporate
80.
"share-like features" such as paying interest); see also New Zealand Financial Market
Authority (FMA)'s statement, according to which "a token linked to the value of a dollar
or commodity could be a debt security if: investors can purchase a token with money;
investors holding the token have the right to redeem that token for money; and an
investor holding the token is not the beneficial owner of funds from which redemption
proceeds are paid." Kelly Buchanan, Regulatory Approaches to Cryptoassets: New
Zealand, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Apr. 2019) (citing Fin. Mrk. Auth. (N.Z.) Initial Coin
Offers (Feb. 11, 2019). An example for this type of token would be Steem Blockchain
Dollar. See Steem: An Incentivized, Blockchain-based, Public Content Platform, at 8
(Aug. 2017), steem.io/steem-whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/L276-QGDU] (archived
Nov. 10, 2019) ("Steem [Blockchain] Dollars are created by a mechanism similar to
convertible notes. . . . In the start-up world, convertible notes are short-term debt
instruments that can be converted to ownership at a rate determined in the future,
typically during a future funding round.. . . The terms of the convertible note allow the
holder to convert to the backing token with minimum notice at the fair market price of
the token.").
For example, the DGX token represents one gram of gold, and it can be
81.
managed and transferred on top of the Ethereum blockchain. See Anthony C. Eufemio,
Kai C. Chng & Shaun Djie, Digix's Whitepaper: The Gold Standard in Crypto-Assets,
DIGIx (Jan. 2016), digix.global/whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.c/DC7E-K7NJ] (archived
Nov. 10, 2019).
See Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., The ICO Gold Rush: It's a Scam, It's a Bubble, It's
82.
a Super Challenge for Regulators 7 (Univ. of Lux., Law Working Paper No. 2017-011;
Univ. of New S. Wales, Law Research Paper No. 83; Univ. of H.K., Faculty of Law
Research Paper No. 2017/035; European Banking Inst., Working Paper Series 2018 no.
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3072298
2018),
18,
[https://perma.cc/WD9L-6C57] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (enumerating a series of possible
rights that can be attached to a token).
See Hacker & Thomale, supra note 57 (linking liquidity of actively-traded
83.
tokens to negotiability).
84.
For the definition proposed by Hacker & Thomale, see id. (arguing tokens
provide utility "in the form of access to a product that the developers ... are creating.").
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(1) Usage Token: A token that a user must hold in order to gain
access to services a specific platform provides. 85 An example is
Ether: to use the Ethereum network-create or execute smart

contracts-a user must pay fees that can be paid solely with
Ether. 86 Another example would be Filecoin, a "decentralized
storage network that turns cloud storage into an algorithmic
market." 8 7 This network runs on a blockchain and has a native

token called FIL. 88 To gain access to the decentralized storage
network and store or distribute data, users must pay with FIL. 89
(2) Work token: A work token gives the right to contribute to a
platform, and be compensated in exchange for this work, usually
with a native token. 90 An example is Augur's Reputation (REP)
token. 9 1 Augur is "a trustless, decentralized oracle and platform
for prediction markets." 92 It allows anyone to create prediction
markets in a decentralized manner. 93 A prediction market can be
created, for example, to determine whether Donald Trump will be
elected president of the United States in 2020. After the election
ends, Augur will come to consensus about whether Trump won
with the help of REP token holders, who can stake their tokens to

report on a market's possible outcome. If the report is "true" (i.e.,

85.
See Zetzsche et al., supra note 82, at 7 (defining usage tokens as those
representing "a license to use a software program.").
86.
See Buterin, Ethereum Paper, supra note 45, at 20 (highlighting a feature of
Ethereum that is lacking in bitcoin: ability to pay transaction fees directly in the
currency); Rohr & Wright, supra note 27, at 473 (describing Ether "as a form of 'crypto
fuel' necessary for the network to function").
87.
See Filecoin & Protocol Labs, Filecoin:A Decentralized Storage Network, at 1
(July 19, 2017), filecoin.io/filecoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/78PP-DAJY] (archived Nov. 10,
2019).
88.
See id. (introducing the Filecoin system's properties).
89.
For an overview of Filecoin, see generally Sabrina T. Howell, Marina Niessner
& David Yermack, Initial Coin Offerings: FinancingGrowth with Cryptocurrency Token
Sales 17-21 (European Corp. Governance Inst. (ECGI), Finance Working Paper No.
564/2018,
2018),
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working-papers/documents/finalhowellniessneryer
mack.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LK3-7YPZ] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) (showing how a
successful ICO works through the case study of Filecoin).
90.
For a discussion of work tokens, see generally Anjan Vinod, Stake to Play
Token Economics: Exploring Work Tokens, BLOcKCHAIN AT BERKELEY (Apr. 12, 2019),
https://medium.com/blockchain-at-berkeley/stake-to-play-token-economics-exploringwork-tokens-7elb30ec53dc [https://perma.cc/4DA4-57JN] (archived Nov. 10, 2019).
91.
For a short overview about Augur's token as a work token, see Howell et al.,
supra note 89, at 14-15.
92.
See Jack Peterson et al., Augur: A DecentralizedOracle and PredictionMarket
Platform,
AUGUR
1
(July
12,
2018),
www.augur.net/whitepaper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FWN4-FFEA] (archived Nov. 10, 2019).
93.
See id. (claiming Augur seeks to reduce prediction markets' risks and
limitations by decentralizing them).
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consistent with the consensus reached by the other token holders)
the reporter will receive her REP tokens back, plus a portion of
94
If the report is not
the settlement fees from the platform.
consistent with the consensus, then the reporter will be financially
penalized. 95 Therefore, REP is a work token; it gives users the

right to contribute to the platform (report on a market's outcome)
and be compensated for it (if the report is accurate).
(3) Pure utility token: a utility token that is neither a usage nor a
work token.

D. Initial Coin Offering (ICO)
The last subpart in this Part focuses on ICOs. It explains what
ICOs are, what the benefits of ICOs are, how ICOs work, and how ICOs
are different from IPOs. Understanding these features of ICOs is
essential both for analyzing determinants of ICO success and for
designing an optimal regulation regime.

1. What Are ICOs?
Though there is no one official and widely accepted definition for
ICO (sometimes called "token sale" or "token generating event"
(TGE)), 96 it is basically a new form of fundraising wherein blockchainrelated ventures raise public capital (in the form of either fiat
currencies or cryptocurrencies) in exchange for newly issued digital
tokens. 97 After the initial offering, the tokens can generally be either
exchanged among investors or converted into other cryptocurrencies
(or fiat currencies) on the secondary market, in cryptocurrency
exchanges.

See id. at 9-10 (claiming that true outcomes are rewarded with fifty percent
94.
more REP, making REP holders disputing false outcomes come ahead in their returns);
Howell et al., supra note 89, at 15 (explaining how Augur's REP returns work).
See Peterson et al., supra note 92, at 3 (introducing Augur's reporting system).
95.
In this Article, we use the term ICO because it is the most accepted one.
96.
However, it should be noted that this term might be misleading since most ICOs fix in
advance the maximum token supply, and thus there is no subsequent offerings. See
Moral Hazard, supra note 11, at 2 & n.1 (explaining the terms token sales and ICO are
often used interchangeably).
For other definitions, see Adhami et al., supra note 7, at 64 (defining ICOs as
97.
"calls for funding promoted by organizations, companies, and entrepreneurs to raise
money through cryptocurrencies, in exchange for a 'token' that can be sold on the
Internet or used in the future to obtain products or services and, at times, profits.");
Fisch, supra note 16, at 3 (defining ICOs broadly as "a mechanism used by new ventures
to raise capital by selling tokens to a crowd of investors," implying that ICOs utilize a
crowdfunding approach); Moral Hazard, supra note 11, at 2 (defining ICOs as "smart
contracts programmed on distributed ledger technology (DLT), which are designed to
raise external finance without the need for an intermediary by issuing tokens or coins
that can be publicly traded.").
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2. What Are the Benefits of ICOs?
The idea of ICO was first applied by J.R. Willet to launch the
Mastercoin in 2013.98 Four years later, in 2017, over $10 billion was
raised by over one thousand firms, 99 and by October 2018, over $21
billion was raised by over three thousand firms. 100 Against that
background, this subpart discusses the benefits associated with
ICOs-both
from
investors'
perspectives
and
from
firms'
perspectives-which may partially explain this rapid growth.
From firms' perspectives, there are four major benefits associated
with ICOs. First, when an issuer issues a utility token (e.g., a token
that grants the right to access a future service), it can create a user
base during the ICO itself. 101 In such cases, token holders become not
only investors who help to fund the service but also future users of this

very service, 10 2 and hence they are likely to be more engaged in the
project. They can help the issuer, for example, to test earlier versions
of its service and assess whether additional adjustments are
required,10 3 information that can be very valuable to ICO's issuers
given the immaturity of the ICO industry. Additionally, in such cases,
the ICO provides the issuer "with an early signal about consumer
demand, which enables better informed investments in building the
platform."1 04
Second, and related to the previous point, issuers conducting an

ICO potentially can benefit from a network effect. Lin William Cong et
al. developed a theoretical
to which when a platform
join the platform not only
the rising token price as a

model with respect to this matter, according.
has a native token (coin), investors (users)
to enjoy its utility, but also to benefit from
result of the growing network size. 105 Since

the value of the issued tokens is determined (at least partially) by the
network size of its users, issuers have an incentive to attract as many

98.

Shin, supranote 1.
ICO Market Analysis 2018, supra note 2, at 4.
100. Momtaz et al., supra note 3, at 33.
101. Howell et al., supra note 89, at 7.
102. Collomb et al., supra note 78, at 287.
103. Id.
104. Howell et al., supra note 89, at 7; see also Christian Catalini & Joshua S.
Gans, Initial Coin Offerings and the Value of Crypto Tokens 32-34 (MIT Sloan Sch.
Working
Paper
No.
5347-18,
2018),
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3137213
[https://perma.cc/J6AB-MEDC]
(archived Nov. 11, 2019) (discussing how consumer demand is estimated).
105. Lin William Cong, Ye Li & Neng Wang, Tokenomics: Dynamic Adoption and
Valuation 28-29 (Colum. Bus. Sch. Res. Paper No. 18-46, Sept. 2018),
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3153860 (last visited Nov. 11, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/9FYD-YFAD] (archived Nov. 11, 2019).

99.
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users as possible,106 and investors have an incentive to prejoin the
107
ICO-to benefit from the value appreciation.
Third, using the ICO mechanism, firms can raise capital from the
public without diluting their holdings in the company. Tokens can
represent a variety of rights and obligations and can be defined to
08
embody utility-like rights only.1 Indeed, empirical evidence suggests
09
that the majority of ICOs do not confer ownership rights.1
Last, the ICO mechanism provides firms with benefits in terms of
global outreach and transaction costs. The process of creating a new
11 0
token can be very simple and cheap using the ERC20 standard.
Potential issuers can download the code for the token from Ethereum's
website and then easily adjust the code to set parameters like the total
amount of tokens that they want to create."' Similarly, the launch of
2
the ICO itself is very simple and cheap compared to IPOs.1" The issuer
simply creates an address to which investors' funds will be sent, and
after investors send their funds to the address, they receive tokens in
accordance with a predefined exchange ratio (e.g., 1 Ether = 500
Tokens). On top of that, ICO operates as a "worldwide crowdfunding
event,"11 3 which means that issuers may easily obtain a global
outreach.

From investors' perspectives, the ICO mechanism offers a twofold
benefit. First, investors may enjoy liquidity in early stages of the

114
and
company. Most ICO projects are launched at the idea stage,

their tokens become tradeable on average between 18.5-93 days after

the ICO ends.11 5 This means that investors can easily sell their

106. Paul P. Momtaz, Initial Coin Offerings 9 (July 7, 2018) (unpublished
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
author),
with
file
(on
manuscript)
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3166709 [https://perma.cc/V9NT-VUG] (archived Nov. 11,
2019) [hereinafter Momtaz, Initial Coin Offerings].
107. Howell et al., supranote 89, at 8.
108. ORG. ECON. COOPERATION & DEv., INITIAL COIN OFFERINGS (ICOS) FOR SME
http://www.oecd.org/finance/ICOs-for-SME-Financing.pdf
(2019),
46
FINANCING
[https://perma.cc/3CXP-5XK2] (archived Nov. 11, 2019) [hereinafter OECD]; Collomb et
al., supra note 78, at 287-88.
109. See infra Part III.C.1.
110. See Momtaz, Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 106, at 10 (explaining that the
process of creating a token is straightforward and may be completed within minutes).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Rohr & Write, supra note 27, at 478.
114.

ERNST & YOUNG, EY RESEARCH: INITIAL COIN OFFERINGS 16 (Dec. 2017),

https://www. ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-research-initial-coin-offerings[https://perma.ccV2CQ-XPWZ]
icos/$File/ey-research-initial-coin-offerings-icos.pdf
(archived Nov. 11, 2019) [hereinafter EY 2017].
115. Hugo Benedetti & Leonard Kostovetsky, Digital Tulips? Returns to Investors
in Initial Coin Offerings 19 (May 20, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3182169
author),
[https://perma.cc/EU4C-3HFW] (archived Nov. 11, 2019) (finding that the average time
is thirty-one days and the median time is 16 days). They also find that some ICOs were
listed prior to the end of the ICO. Id.; Lee et al., supra note 18, at 25 (finding that the
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holdings in the early stages of the firm. Second, investing in ICOs is

easy and cheap. In order to invest in a foreign company through an
IPO, a potential investor will probably need to use the services of a
broker.1

16

In ICOs, on the other hand, potential investors need only to

have access to the internet. 11 7 This means that, from an investor's
perspective, investing in ICOs is often easier and less costly compared
to IPOs.
3. How Do ICOs Work?
This subpart outlines the process that a venture undergoes during

the ICO. The ICO process can be divided into three stages: pre-ICO,
ICO launch, and post-ICO. 118
Pre-ICO: At the first stage, ICOs are generally announced on the
internet, mainly in cryptocurrency forums (such as BitcoinTalk). 1 19
The announcements usually include executive summaries presenting

the idea of the project,1 20 and their objectives are to attract interest
and obtain feedback from the community.121 After the announcement,
the venture typically publishes a white paper that discloses
information about the project, like a prospectus for an IPO.1 2 2 As the
ICO market is yet unregulated, the information disclosed in the white
paper is unaudited and hence limited and often misleading. 123

average time from ICO completion to listing is 18.5 days); Momtaz, Initial Coin
Offerings, supra note 106, at 17 (finding that the average time from the end of ICO to
first listing is ninety-three days).
116. ICO Vs IPO:Key Differences, COINTELEGRAPH, https://cointelegraph.com/ico101/ico-vs-ipo-key-differences#utility-investors-profit
(last visited Nov. 11, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/C5XJ-EG42] (archived Nov. 11, 2019).
117. Id.
118. For other descriptions of the ICO process, see Thomas Bourveau, Emmanuel
T. De George, Atif Ellahie & Daniele Macciocchi, Initial Coin Offerings: Early Evidence
on the Role of Disclosure in the Unregulated Crypto Market 56-57 (July 9, 2018)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with Univ. of S. Cal., Marshall Sch. of Bus.) (providing
the detailed steps of the ICO process); Collomb et al., supra note 78, at 276-279 (defining
the process as (i) prior to, (ii) during, and (iii) after the contribution period); Howell et
al., supra note 89, at 9-14.
119. Lee et al., supra note 18, at 8.
120. Discussion Paper on Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), AUTORITt DES MARCHES
FINANCIERS
(AMF)
2,
(Oct.
26,
2017),
www.amffrance.org/enUS/Publications/Consultationspubliques/Archives?docId=workspace%3A%2F%2FSpacesStore%2Fa2b267b3-2d944c24-acad-7fe3351dfc8a (last visited Nov. 11 , 2019) [https://perma.cc/S7V4-SBYM]
(archived Nov. 11, 2019) [hereinafter "AMF Discussion Paper"].
121. See id. (explaining the objectives of announcing an ICO); Lee et al., supra note
18, at 26.
122. Bourveau et al., supra note 118, at 57; Lee et al., supra note 18, at 7.
123. While white papers vary dramatically, they generally include information
about: (1) the business model; (2) the technical aspects and the source code; (3) the issued
token-the rights and obligations attached to it; (4) the token supply, allocation, and
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With regard to the marketing process, issuers of an ICO generally
communicate directly with potential investors through social media
platforms. Lauren Rhue found that every ICO has a median of eight
124
and Sabrina T. Howell et al. found
social media links on its website,
that 87 percent (97 percent) of ICOs have a Telegram group (Twitter
account) with an average of over five thousand (22,200) members
(followers).1 25 Social media channels play an important role in ICOs'
marketing, allowing the issuers to provide ongoing updates about the
6
project and respond to investors' questions and queries.12

As a part of the marketing process, some ventures also execute
27
bounty programs and airdrops.1 The former is a program in which a
venture offers rewards (generally in the form of the issued digital
28
For example, an
tokens) in exchange for performing certain tasks.1

distribution; (5) how the capital collected will be used; (6) the issuing entities; (7) the law
applicable to the ICO and its regulatory status; (8) the launch of the ICO-the duration,
hard and soft cap, and which currencies will be accepted during the token sale; and (9)
the project's course of development (often called roadmap). This list is not exhaustive
and its sole purpose is to illustrate the nature of the content. For further information on
that matter, see AMF Discussion Paper, supranote 137, at 2 (explaining the information
included in ICO publications); Summary of Replies to the Public Consultationon Initial
Coin Offerings (ICOs) and Update on the UNICORN Programme, AUTORITt DES
MARCHtS

FINANCIERS

(AMF)

11-17

(2018),

www.amf-

&

france.org/enUS/Publications/Consultations85
-f015pubhliques/Archives?docld=workspace%3A%2F%2FSpacesStore%2Fa9eae
(archived Nov. 11, 2019)
4beb-92d2-ece78819d4da [https://perma.cc/4F2N-542P]
(detailing debate over the information to be included in an ICO); Bourveau et al., supra
note 118, at 3 (listing the content provided in ICO publications and the associated risk
of misinformation) For papers that show that the disclosed information is often limited
and misleading, see Cohney et al., supra note 26, at 597-98 (comparing the promises
made in the disclosure documents with the actual functionality of the digital tokens for
the top fifty ICOs that raised the most capital in 2017 and finding that many have failed
to meet their promises); Thomas Bourveau, Emmanuel T. De George, Atif Ellahie
Daniele Macciocchi, Information Intermediaries in the Crypto-Tokens Market 2-3 (May
2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Information
Intermediaries] (specifying that the process is self-regulated, which has risks for
investors); Zetzsche et al., supra note 82, at 32 (examining over 1000 ICO white papers
and found that most lack vital information required to assess the ICO's financial
potential as well as its legal status).
124. Rhue, supra note 9, at 14.
125. Howell et al., supra note 89, at 24; see also David Florysiak & Alexander
Schandlbauer, The Information Content of ICO White Paper 21 (June 21, 2019)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract-id=3265007 [https://perma.cc/8YDH-WW3K] (archived Nov. 11,
2019) (finding that the most common channels are Twitter (ninety-six percent), Facebook
(eighty-nine percent), and Telegram (eighty-five percent)).
126. See OECD, supra note 108, at 10 (explaining that Twitter, Facehook, and
Github are used to market and promote the ICOs); Bourveau et al., supra note 118, at
36 (finding that successful issuers have higher social media activity than unsuccessful
issuers).
127. OECD, supra note 108, at 10.
128. See Genson Glier, What Are ICO & Token Sale Bounty Programs?,
BLOCKTOKEN (May 16, 2018), https://medium.com/blocktoken/what-are-ico-token-salebounty-programs-9d1c39fa3685 [https://perma.cc/4QUP-Q72Q] (archived Nov. 17, 2019).
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ICO may reward rating websites for writing an article about the ICO,
or individuals for translating their documents into different languages
or fixing bugs in the underlying code.12 9 The latter is a program in
which the venture distributes digital tokens to investors entirely for

free.1 30 Sometimes, in order to receive the "free" tokens, investors are
required to follow the venture on social media.1 3 1 The rationale here is
to raise awareness of the project and encourage the token's adoption
(network effect).132

Normally, ventures also disclose their underlying code on an
online code repository (mainly GitHub),1 33 enabling potential investors
to preassess their code before the ICO.1 34 Publishing the underlying

code provides a "powerful form of transparency," and it also "leverages

the wisdom of the crowd to identify bugs and improve quality."1 35
Additionally, ICOs generally conduct private and public presales

prior to the launch.13 6 The purpose of the early funding is twofold.

129. Id. For examples, see COBINHOOD's and COTI's bounty programs:
COBINHOOD, Bug and Security Breach Bounty Program Get COB rewards for
Reporting Platform Issues, MEDIUM (Nov. 10, 2017); COTI, COTI Launches Bounty
Program in Partnership with BountyOx (15/4 Update), STEEMIT (Nov. 30, 2017),
https://steemit.com/cryptocurrency/@cotinetwork/coti-launches-bounty-program-inpartnership-with-bounty0x-15-4-update [https://perma.cc/FB4T-UL6J] (archived Nov.
11, 2019).
130. See OECD, supra note 108, at 11.
131. When this is the case, the tokens are not entirely free. Instead, they are
distributed in exchange for investors' personal data. See Zax, Is PersonalData the New
Currency? MIT TECH. REv. (2011) (explaining that Facebook and other social networks
make money off of data collection), www.technologyreview.com/s/426235/is-personaldata-the-new-currency (last visited Nov. 11, 2019) [https://perma.c/ZWZ8-GRGY]
(archived Nov. 11, 2019); Jonathan Minger, The ICO Handbook Chapter:Six, Airdrops,
STEEMIT (Feb., 2018), steemit.com/ico/@jonklinger/chapter-six-airdrops (last visited Nov.
11, 2019) [https://perma.cc/6Q5C-KRUX] (archived Nov. 11, 2019) (highlighting that
tokens may be distributed based on interaction with social media accounts and the value
of this data collection may be quantifiable).
132. See Brady Dale, So Long ICOs, Hello Airdrops: The Free Token Giveaway
Craze Is Here, COINDESK (Mar. 16, 2018), www.coindesk.com/long-icos-hello-airdropsfree-token-giveaway-craze/ [https://perma.cc/R9XL-EBQS] (archived Nov. 9, 2019)
(explaining that tokens are provided to potential users for joining the network to increase
the value of the network).
133. See infra Part III.B.2.
134. See Adhami et al., supra note 7, at 4, 7 (explaining that the disclosure helps
investors determine the technical value of the idea and prior work of the team).
135. Howell et al., supra note 89, at 24.
136. Adhami et al., supra note 7, at 9 (finding that thirty-eight percent of the
sample organized presales); Benedetti & Kostovetsky, supra note 115, at 44 (finding that
forty percent of the sample had a presale); Fisch, supra note 16, at 14 (finding that sixtyfour percent of the sample had a presale); Howell et al., supra note 89, at 12, (finding
that forty-five percent of the sample had a presale); Momtaz, Initial Coin Offerings,
supra note 106, at 9 (finding that forty-four percent of the sample had a presale);
Zetzsche et al., supra note 82, at 7 (finding that twenty-two percent of the sample
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First, to finance the costs of promoting the ICO in the preliminary

stage. Second, analogous to the book-building process in IPOs, early
investments rounds provide an indication of the demand for the token,
37
thus helping to determine an appropriate price for the launch.1 The
presale targets larger investors, mainly institutional investors, and
VCs,138 and offers them discounts or bonuses in exchange for taking
39
more risk (investing at an early stage).1
The Launch of the ICO: During the main sale, the venture issues
digital tokens for a predefined period. The contribution period can be
40
The
either fixed in time or capped by a predetermined threshold.1
venture generally specifies a hard cap, which is the maximum amount
of capital they aim to collect, and a soft cap, which is the minimum
14
amount of funds required for the ICO to process as planned. 1 An ICO
is considered successful if it reaches its soft cap during the contribution
42
period; otherwise, the funds are usually returned to the investors.1 If
43
the hard cap is reached, the token sale ends.1
The contribution during the token sale is made through the project
website. Investors are required to transfer money (either crypto or fiat
currencies) to a smart contract address, which in return transfers a
44
The sale itself operates
predefined amount of tokens to the sender.1
45
However, due to regulatory
as a "worldwide crowdfunding event."1
concerns, ICOs often exclude residents of certain countries (mainly
46
China and the United States).1
The pricing mechanisms by which ICOs sell their tokens are
usually announced to the public prior to the token sale and include a
few different schemes. Most ICOs sell their tokens during the launch,
47
on a fixed price and "first-come, first-served" basis;1 others establish
dynamic pricing mechanisms, in which the price changes during the
sale in a predefined way or in a way that reflects the demand of the
49
Gnosis, for
token;1 48 and some ICOs use an auction mechanism.1
example, used a reverse Dutch auction, in which the portion of tokens
50
sold and their price depended on how long the sale took to finish.1

organized a presale, but suggest that the actual number is higher, given the information
asymmetry associated with ICOs).
137. Howell et al., supra note 89, at 12.
138. Usually a minimum contribution threshold is specified for the presales.
139. Howell et al., supra note 89, at 12.
140. Collomb et al., supra note 78, at 277.
141. See Lee et al., supranote 18, at 40.
142. Id. at 8.
143. Id.
144. Rohr & Wright, supra note 27, at 473-75
145. Id. at 478.
146. See infra Part III.C.2.
147. Howell et al., supra note 89, at 11.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 12.
150. Vitalik Buterin, Analyzing Token Sale Models, VITALIK BUTERIN'S WEBSITE
(June 9, 2017), vitalik.ca/general/2017/06/09/sales.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2019)

20201

ICO v. IPO: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

551

Post-ICO: After the token sale ends, ICOs generally list their

tokens in crypto exchanges, and the issued tokens are then traded on
the secondary market. 151 A portion of the tokens received during the
main token sale is usually reserved for founders, employees, and
platform development, and/or for incentivizing future network

achieved. Such lock-up mechanisms prevent founders from dumping
their tokens after the ICO ends and may increase investors' confidence

and certainty about the use of proceeds. 153
4. How is an ICO Different from an IPO?
In an ICO, like in an IPO, a company issues a share (a token) in

order to raise public capital, and this share (token) is then traded on
the secondary market. Nevertheless, there are major differences
between the two methods. 154
First, the rights conferred to investors of an ICO are considerably
different from those of an IPO.155 In an IPO, shareholders get
ownership rights in the company, dividend rights, and voting rights
depending on the type of the shares issued.156 In an ICO, by contrast,
the issued tokens can represent a variety of rights and obligations and
can be defined to embody utility-like rights only. This difference
implies that issuers of an ICO can raise public capital without diluting
their ownership over the. company, thus overcoming a major
impediment associated with an IPO. 15 7

[https://perma.cc/5LQ9-AL4L] (archived Nov. 9, 2019). Commentators have criticized
this pricing mechanism, as well as any other mechanism that benefits early investors,
for creating a "fear of missing out". See Alyssa Hertig, ICO Insanity? $300 Million Gnosis
Valuation Sparks Market Reaction, COINDESK (Apr. 25, 2017) (explaining that Gnosis
priced tokens so that the tokens would get less expensive over time to encourage later
investment), https://www.coindesk.com/ethereum-ico-irrationality-300-million-gnosisvaluation-sparks-market-concerns (last visited Nov. 11, 2019) [https://perma.cc/32ADRJBR] (archived Nov. 11, 2019).
151. See infra Part III.E.1.
152. Howell et al., supra note 89, at 11.
153. Bourveau et al., supra note 118, at 36-38.
154. For a comparison between IPOs and ICOs, see OECD, supra note 108, at 2426; Collomb et al., supra note 78, at 293-300; Lee et al., supra note 18, at 51.
155. OECD, supra note 108, at 25 (detailing that IPOs confer ownership rights and
ICOs do not); Collomb et al., supra note 78, at 287 (explaining that an IPO is concerned
with issuance of stock that will dilute the ownership for existing shareholders, whereas
an ICO refers to tokens that may not be directly tied to a company).
156. OECD, supra note 108, at 25.
157. See id. (explaining that ICOs may be advantageous to entrepreneurs who do
not want to give away any ownership.

,

contributors. 152 These tokens are generally locked in smart contracts
for a specific period or until certain development milestones have been
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Second, and related to the previous point, documentation
requirements are different. While a company that launches an IPO
faces disclosure and registration requirements imposed by the
securities regulator, ICOs' disclosure requirements are unclear and
depend on their function as well as on the governing jurisdiction. 158
Most ICOs generally publish a white paper that outlines the business

model of the project, a technical white paper that features the
technological aspects of the project, and the source code of the
project.1 59 However, unlike IPOs' documentation, ICOs' documentation
format is not standard and the documents disclosed tend to be poor and
often misleading.160 This absence of standard disclosure requirements
exacerbates the information asymmetries between token issuers and
investors. 161
Third, ICOs are launched at a lower level of maturity compared to
IPOs.1 62 In order to initiate an IPO, a potential issuer will have to
"demonstrate a proper (and stable) amount of revenues, which can only
63
be achieved after a company has reached a certain level of maturity."1
This is partially due to the listing requirements of exchanges and the
tendency of investment banks (which act as underwriters) to select
64
ICOs, on the
IPOs that have the potential to perform well after.1
other hand, allow firms to raise public capital outside of the traditional
capital market-without the involvement of underwriters and
traditional exchanges-and thus they can be launched at a very early
stage. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that the majority of ICOs
65
This difference between ICOs' and
are launched at the idea stage.1
IPOs' levels of maturity is important because it translates into
66
different degrees of risk and information asymmetries.1
Fourth, ICOs' marketing process is significantly different from
IPOs' marketing process. While in an IPO an underwriter conducts a
book-building process, ICOs' marketing is done primarily through
social media channels.1 67 In contrast with IPOs, which generally use
social media to raise awareness for the project, ICOs use social media
to publish vital information like launch announcements and to

158. Lee et al., supra note 18, at 7; OECD, supra note 108, at 26. For an overview
of the top twenty-five ICO jurisdictions in market capitalizations and their comparative
regulatory responses, see generally Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Coin Offerings: The Top 25
Jurisdictionsand Their Comparative Regulatory Responses, 1 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L.
& POL'Y 41 (2018).
159. See infra Part III.B.
160. See Information Intermediaries, supra note 123, at 1-3.
161. Fisch, supranote 16, at 6.
162. Collomb et al., supra note 78, at 296-297.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 297.
165. EY 2017, supra note 114, at 16 (finding that most ICOs are in the idea stage,
and their platforms/services are expected to be launched in a year or more after the ICO).
166. Collomb et al., supra note 78, at 296 & n.102; Fisch, supra note 16, at 6.
167. See infra Part III.B.3.
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communicate directly with potential investors.1 68 This difference in the
way firms market their launches and communicate with their investors
translates into different investor-investee relationships, and is
important since it affects the way by which firms can reduce
uncertainty about their projects.

III. ICO CHARACTERISTICS-REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE EMPIRICAL
LITERATURE

ICO is a relatively new concept, and accordingly the literature on
ICOs is still in its infancy. Many aspects of this newly innovative
market-such as terminology, token typology, regulation, and token
valuation-have remained unclear. This Part focuses on the growing
body of empirical literature on ICO characteristics and determinants
of ICO success and returns. It systematically reviews over twenty
empirical studies, most of which were conducted during 2018-2019,
and identifies key success factors. Subsequently, it offers theoretical

explanations, and in certain cases, connects the empirical results with
the IPO and crowdfunding literatures. The analysis presented in this
Part is important, because there is no single formal data source, and

there is evidence of inconsistencies across the different data sources
available.
A. A General Overview
The idea of ICOs was first applied in 2013.169 Four years later, in
2017, over $10 billion was raised by over one thousand firms;1 70 by
October 2018, over $21 billion was raised by over three thousand
firms.171 Similarly, while the largest ICO in 2016, Wave, raised around

$16 million, 17 2 the largest ICO in 2018, EOS, raised $4.2 billion.1 73
The rapid growth of the crypto market and ICOs in particular can
be explained by several factors. First, cryptocurrencies are perceived

168. Mathieu Chanson et al., Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs): The Role of Social
Media for Organizational Legitimacy and Underpricing 6 (Oct. 2018) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with Research Gate).
169. Shin, supra note 1.
170. ICO Market Analysis 2018, supra note 2.
171. Momtaz et al., supra note 3, at 33.
172. For an overview of the top ICOs completed in 2016 and 2017, see Bourveau et
al., supra note 118, at 51.
173. See Daniele Pozzi, ICO Market 2018 vs 2017: Trends, Capitalization,
Localization, Industries, Success
Rate,
COINTELEGRAPH
(Jan.
5,
2019),
https://cointelegraph.com/news/ico-market-2018-vs-2017-trends-capitalizationlocalization-industries-success-rate [https:f/perma.cc/LS7E-KJUE] (archived Mar. 3,
2020).
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by investors as a "hedge against volatile local currencies and
geopolitical risk," and their growth might be related to a continuing
distrust in the traditional banking sector since the 2008 financial
crisis. 174 Second, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis,
conventional banks and VC firms became more selective when
granting loans, thus pushing start-ups to seek for an alternative source
of finance.17 5 Third, as previously discussed, ICOs are attractive for
ventures due to low transaction costs and potential global outreach.176
7
Fourth, the increased media attention,17 combined with astronomic
78
returns for early investors-with ROIs exceeding 50,000 percent1
79
and a network effect,1 have attracted new investors and ventures.

1. Fundraising Success Rate
Empirical studies suggest that while the ICOs' fundraising
success rate was considerably higher in the early days of the market,
it has been decreasing since the second half of 2017. Jongsub Lee et al.
found that the fundraising success rate in the first quarter of 2018 was
approximately 50 percent, down from 90 percent in the second quarter
of 2017.180 Ernst & Young found that "in November 2017, less than
8
25% hit goals, compared with more than 90% in June."1 1 Hugo
Benedetti and Leonard Kostovetsky analyzed 2,390 ICOs that occurred
between January 2017 and March 2018 and found that only 48 percent
had "non-zero and non-missing values for capital raised" and that only

26 percent "have listed their tokens on an exchange."18

2

Conversely,

Saman Adhami et al. analyzed a sample of 253 ICOs that occurred from
2014 to August 2017 and found that 81 percent of ICOs were
successful.1 8 3 This sharp deterioration in fundraising success may be

174. Clements, supra note 4, at 78.
175. See Joern H. Block, Geertjan De Vries & Philipp Sandner, Venture Capital
and the Financial Crisis: An Empirical Study across Industries and Countries, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF VENTURE CAPITAL 43-48 (Douglas Cumming ed., 2012) (finding

that VC activity slowed down after the 2008 crisis).
176. See infra Part II.D.2.
177. Clements, supra note 4, at 86.
178. See
Top
10
ICOs
with
the
Biggest ROI,
COINTELEGRAPH,
(last
cointelegraph.com/ico-101/top-10-icos-with-the-biggest-roi#10-qtum--9225-roi
visited Nov. 11, 2019) [https://perma.cc/U5HU-BKTC) (archived Nov. 11, 2019); Coin and
Crypto, Early Investors Are Making 50,000% Returns on ICOs, HACKER NOON (Dec. 5,
hackernoon.com/investors-are-making-50-000-returns-on-icos-32432bc741d
2017),
(last visited Nov. 11, 2019) [https://perma.cc/N5Q3-UYYT] (archived Nov. 11, 2019)
(providing examples of high ROIs).
179. Clements, supra note 4, at 77.
180. See Lee et al., supra note 18, at 15, 36.
181. EY 2017, supra note 114, at 8.
182. Benedetti & Kostovetsky, supra note 115, at 15.
183. Adhami et al., supra note 7, at 8-10.
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due to increased regulation, or, alternatively, to the lemons problem:

the "hot" market has attracted low-quality ICOs.1 84
2. Gross proceeds
Empirical studies suggest that during 2015-2018 the average
number of funds raised by an ICO was between $13-$16 million. 185 For
example, according to a 2018 report by ICOBench, the average number
of funds raised by an ICO during 2017 was $14.1 million. 186 Similarly,
a report by Tokendata and Fabric Ventures suggests that the average
number of funds raised in 2017 was $13 million.1 87 Other recent
empirical studies-which analyze a dataset of ICOs conducted
primarily between 2015 and 2018-find that the average number of
funds raised in an ICO is around $15-$16 million.1 88 These results are
interesting, because most ICOs are launched at a very early stage and
provide little information for investors, but yet manage to raise a large
amount of funds. All these empirical studies also find a big difference
between the average and the median indicator, indicating that the
amount raised in an ICO is skewed toward large ICOs.

3. The Geography of ICOs
According to ICOBench, the most comprehensive database to date,
the top country in the number of ICOs is the United States, followed
by Singapore, the United Kingdom, and Russia.1 89 The United States

184. Lee et al., supra note 18, at 15-16; see generally Akerlof, supra note 12
(explaining the incentive to market poor quality merchandise when returns for good
quality merchandise affect the whole market instead of the individual seller).
185. ICO Market Analysis 2018, supra note 2.
186. ICO Market Analysis 2018, supra note 2, at 4.
187. Fabric Ventures & TokenData, The State of the Token Market A Year in
Review
&
an
Outlook
for
2018,
at
7
(2018),
https://static1.squarespace.comstatic/5a9ea6c27d8615635f8Ol/t/5a73697bc8302551
711523ca/1517513088503/The+State+of+the+Token+Market+Final2.pdf
(last visited
Nov. 9, 2019) [https://perma.ccV5VW-WCJJ] (archived Nov. 9, 2019).
188. See, e.g., Ryan Amsden & Denis Schweizer, Are Blockchain Crowdsales the
New 'Gold Rush'? Success Determinants of Initial Coin Offerings 54 (Apr. 16, 2018)
(unpublished
manuscript)
(on
file
with
author),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3163849
[https://perma.cc/3L9BRQUP] (archived Nov. 11, 2019) (finding that the average (median) number of funds
raised in an ICO is $15.24 million); Lyandres et al., supra note 9, at 16 (finding that the
average number of funds raised in an ICO is $15 million and the median funds raised is
$5 million); Momtaz, Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 106, at 2. (finding that the
average number of funds raised in an ICO is $15.1 million and the median number of
funds raised is $5.8 million).
189. Stats, ICOBENCH, icobench.com/stats (last visited Nov.
11, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/K3UY-2WKE] (archived Nov. 11, 2019) (as of Oct. 24, 2019, the
database consists of 5607 ICOs. 706 in the US, 575 in Singapore, 498 in the UK, and 328
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is also the top country in capital raised, followed by Singapore, British
190
These results are interesting as the
Virgin Islands, and Switzerland.
market shares of countries with relatively small capital markets and
economics (e.g., Singapore, Switzerland, and British Virgin Islands)
are significantly high.191 This could be due to their crypto-friendly
regulatory approach, 9 2 and it implies that a regulatory arbitrage
exists in the market. Consistent with this interpretation, an empirical
report by Token Data and Fabric Ventures shows a significant
difference between the leading countries from a legal domicile
perspective and the leading countries from founders' location
perspective. 193 For example, it shows that in 2017, legal entities
located in Switzerland raised $1.06 billion compared to the $177
94
million raised by founders from Switzerland.1
A few empirical studies analyzed the geography of ICOs, trying to
answer the question of why ICOs are more prevalent in some countries
relative to others. Winifred Huang et al., for example, found that ICOs
are more likely to take place in countries that actively present their
regulatory intentions, instead of banning ICOs or taking no action, and
95
They also found that ICOs
that tax level had no significant effect.1
occur more frequently in countries with developed financial markets,
and where information and communication technology is more
advanced.1 96 A possible explanation for the former result is that a well-

in Russia); see also Amsden & Schweizer, supra note 188, at 32 (finding that the top
country in the number of ICOs is the US, followed by Russia, and that the dominant
country in amounts raised is the U.S. ($2.4 billion), followed by Switzerland ($1.1
billion)); Bourveau et al., supra note 118, at 25 (finding that the top countries in the
number of ICOs are the US, Russia, and Singapore); Adhami et al., supra note 7, at 2
(finding that the top countries in the number of ICOs are the US, Russia, and
Switzerland); Howell et al., supra note 89, at 23-24 (finding that the top countries in the
number of ICOs are the US China, Russia, and Switzerland, and in amounts raised, the
US, Switzerland, Singapore, and Russia); Zetzsche et al., supra note 82, at 14 (finding
that the top countries in the number of ICOs are the US, Singapore, and UK, and in
amounts raised, the US, Singapore, China, and UK).
190. Stats, ICOBENCH, supra note 190 ($7.3 billion in the US, $2.5 billion in
Singapore, $2.4 billion British Virgin Island, and $1.8 billion in Switzerland).
191. For example, while the market capitalization of listed companies in the
United States in 2018 was over forty times larger than Singapore and twenty times
larger than Switzerland, the market capitalization of ICOs in the Unites States was less
than three times larger than Singapore and five times larger than Switzerland. See
Market capitalization of listed companies in current prices, KNEOMA,
https://knoema.com/atlas/topics/Economy/Financial-Sector-Capital-markets/Marketcapitalization (last visited Nov. 11, 2019) [https://perma.cc/9HR8-KMDR] (archived Nov.
11, 2019); Zetzsche et al., supra note 82, at 11-12.
192. Winifred Huang, Michele Meoli & Silvio Vismara, The Geography of Initial
Coin Offerings SMALL BUS. ECON. 6 (2019) (finding that ICOs are more pervasive in
countries with ICO-friendly regulations, such as Singapore and Switzerland).
193. Fabric Ventures & TokenData, supra note 187, at 9.
194. Id.
195. Huang et al., supra note 192, at 18.
196. Id. The former finding is consistent Haddad and Hurnuf who found that
Fintech startup formations occur more frequently in countries with well-developed
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developed financial market offers greater potential to change existing
business models through innovative services and that, in a more
elaborated financial system, entrepreneurs have better access to the
capital required to fund their business. 19 7 An explanation for the latter
result is that the development of information and communication
technology embraces "well-functioning infrastructure facilities and
tech-skilled human capital [that] can accelerate the demand for digital

entrepreneurship."1 98 Benedetti and Kostovetsky found that listed
ICOs are more likely to take place in "countries that are 0.2 points
higher in their Rule of Law rating1 99 and have about $4,000 more in
GDP per capita, relative to the entire sample."2 00

B. Pre-ICO Practices
1. White Paper Disclosure
White paper disclosure-focus on quality: Most ICOs disclose a

white paper that features the business and technical model of the
project prior to launch. 20 1 Empirical studies analyze the relation
between disclosing a white paper and ICO success. On the one hand,
Howell et al. found that disclosing a white paper is positively

associated with liquidity, which is a proxy of ICO success and
volatility. 2 02 On the other hand, Thomas Bourveau et al. found that
more unsuccessful (88 percent) than successful issuers (78 percent)
disclose a white paper, 2 03 and Adhami et al. and Dmitri Boreiko and

&

economies and capital markets. See Christian Haddad & Lars Hornuf, The Emergence of
the Global Fintech Market: Rconomic and Technological Determinants, 53 SMALL Bus.
EcON. 81 (2019).
197. Haddad & Hornuf, supra note 196, at 82-83; Huang et al., supra note 192, at
3.
198. Huang et al., supra note 192, at 6.
199. They rely on World Bank Rule of Law rating, which captures "perceptions of
the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts,
as well as the likelihood of crime and violence." Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay
Massimo Mastruzzi, The Worldwide GovernanceIndicators:Methodology and Analytical
Issues, 3 HAGUE J. ON THE RULE OF LAW 220, 223 (2011).
200. Benedetti & Kostovetsky, supra note 115, at 17-18. These results are
consistent with Haddad and Hurnuf who found that GDP per capita is significant in
explaining the number of financial technology (fintech) startups in a country and with
Rau who found that the Rule of Law ranking is significantly and positively related to
crowdfunding volume within a country. See Raghavendra Rau, Law, Trust, and the
Development of Crowdfunding 25 (June 20, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
Soc. Sci. Research Network); Haddad & Hornuf, supra note 196, at 92.
201. Howell et al., supra note 89, at 38 (finding that eighty-one percent of ICOs
disclosed a white paper).
202. Id. at 3.
203. Bourveau et al., supra note 118, at 42.
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Gioia Vidusso found that there is no significant association between

disclosing a white paper and ICO success. 204 These results suggest that
the quality of the white paper matters and that simply disclosing a
white paper is not enough. As discussed above, the information
disclosed in white papers is unaudited and often misleading, and hence
these results are not surprising.
Consistent with these results, empirical studies found that proxies
of the quality of a white paper are associated with success. Evgeny
Lyandres et al., for example, found that the number of unique words in
the white paper (identified by natural language processing (NLP)) is
positively and reliably associated with the amount raised and with the
probability of listing. 205 Ryan Amsden and Denis Schweizer, Bourveau
et al., and Christian Fisch found that the length of the white paper is
2 06
However, the length
positively associated with the amount raised.
of the white paper does not necessarily signal quality. In fact, in the

context of equity crowdfunding, Kim et al. found that offering too much
information about the idea undermines entrepreneurs' chances of fully
207
but, given the information
securing the resources they need;
asymmetry associated with the market, it is possible that longer white
papers are perceived by investors as a valuable signal. Bourveau et al.
found that white paper opacity is negatively associated with the
amount raised and with liquidity and positively associated with low
208
They also found that
returns (negative 75 percent) in the long term.
having an informative white paper (dummy variable according to
2 09
but when they manually
ICOBench) reliably predicts ICO success,

analyze the association between disclosure practices

(ICO team

information, token allocation information, founder tokens vesting
period, use of proceeds, white paper opacity, and white paper length)
2 0
and ICO success, they found no significant association. 1
Information about regulatorystatus: Adhami et al. found that only
in 19 percent of ICOs, the white paper specifies the jurisdiction that

204. Dmitri Boreiko & Gioia Vidusso, New Blockchain Intermediaries:Do ICO
Rating Websites Do Their Job Well?, 21 J. ALTERNATIVE INv. 67 (2019); Adhami et al.,
supra note 7, at 8.
205. Lyandres et al., supra note 9, at 23.
206. Amsden & Schweizer, supra note 188, at 19; Bourveau et al., supra note 118,
at 46 (finding that log USD raised is positively correlated with white paper length.
However, they also find that having a longer white papers is associated with future crash
risk); Fisch, supra note 16, at 15 (finding that white paper length has a positive effect on
the amount of funds raised (p<1%)).
207. See generally Phillip H. Kim, Micka8l Buffart & Gregoire Croidieu, TMI:
Signaling Credible Claims in Crowdfunding Campaign Narratives, 41 GROUPS & ORG.
MGMT. 717 (2016); Fisch, supra note 16, at 15.
208. Bourveau et al., supra note 118, at 51 (white paper opacity is "[T]he Gunning
Fog index for the whitepaper calculated as (words per sentence + percent of complex
words) x 0.4").
209. Id.
210. Id.
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regulates the ICO. 2 11 Nevertheless, the vast majority of ICOs have
been successful. 2 12 Similarly, Dirk A. Zetzsche et al. found that only
32.7 percent of ICOs specify the applicable law and that most white
papers do not provide information about the regulatory status of an

ICO. 21 3 As most ICOs in their samples have been successful, these

results suggest that potential investors are insensitive to regulatory
issues. 214 An alternative interpretation for these results is that ICO
initiators-especially in the early days of the market-have been
unable to specify the applicable law and jurisdiction due to regulatory
uncertainty.
Focus on technical aspects: While investors are insensitive to
regulatory issues, empirical evidence suggests that potential investors
are very sensitive to technological aspects. Adhami et al. found that
specifying the jurisdiction that regulates the token sale has a much

smaller influence on an ICO's success compared to source code
disclosure. 215 Consistent with these results, Paul P. Momtaz found that
the market uncertainty derived from technical issues-for example,
the hacks of Parity Wallet 21 6-has a much stronger negative effect on
ICO returns than regulatory actions, such as China's and Korea's
bans. 217 Lyandres et al. found that the probability of listing increases
proportionately to the technical language in the white paper. 2 18 Fisch
found that having a technical white paper strongly and significantly

(p<1 percent) affects the amount raised.219 He suggested that investors
might interpret a technical white paper as a strong predictor of a
venture's underlying technological capabilities. 22 0 Chen Feng et al.
found that the amount of technical language in white papers predicts

211. Adhami et al., supra note 7, at 6-8
212. Id.
213. Zetzsche et al., supra note 82, at 11.
214. Id.
215. Adhami et al., supranote 7, at 10.
216. On the Parity Wallet hack, see: Rachel Rose O'Leary, Parity Team Publishes
Postmortem on $160 Million Ether Freeze, COINDESK (Nov.
15, 2017),
https://www.coindesk.com/parity-team-publishes-postmortem-160-million-Ether-freeze
[https://perma.cc/Z4AE-P2ST] (archived Jan. 8, 2019).
217. Momtaz, Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 106, at 38. On South Korea's ban,
see: Rachel Rose O'Leary, South Korean RegulatorIssues ICO Ban, COINDESK (Sept. 29,
2017),
www.coindesk.com/south-korean-regulator-issues-ico-ban
[https://perma.cc/4A3B-KX6Z] (archived Jan. 8, 2019). On China's ban, see Notice on the
Prevention of
Tokens,
PEOPLE'S
BANK
OF
CHINA
(Sept.
4,
2017),
www.pbc.gov.cn/goutongjiaoliu/113456/113469/3374222/index.html
[https://perma.cc/VL5K-9QJG] (archived Feb. 16, 2020). English translation is available
at: Wolfie Zhao, China'sICO Ban: A Full Translationof Regulator Remarks, COINDESK
(Sept. 5, 2017) https://www.coindesk.com/chinas-ico-ban-a-full-translation-of-regulatorremarks [https://perma.cc/3SGJ-ERNX] (archived Nov. 19, 2019).
218. Lyandres et al., supra note 9, at 23.
219. Fisch, supra note 16, at 12-14.
220. Id.
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221
A possible interpretation is that
success only for high-quality ICOs.
projects are more likely to provide technical discussions in the white
paper when they are in more advanced stages. 222
Use of proceeds disclosure: Firms conducting an IPO are required
by securities regulators to include in their prospectuses the intended
3
use of proceeds. 22 Empirical evidence shows that firms that disclose
more (less) specific information about their intended use of proceeds
have lower (higher) underpricing, suggesting that a more detailed use
of proceed disclosure reduces ex ante uncertainty about the value of the
firm. 224 In contrast with IPOs, companies that launch ICOs are not
required to disclose information about their use of proceeds, and
empirical studies found that the majority do not disclose information
225
Empirical studies also analyzed the
about the use of proceeds.

association between disclosing information about the use of proceeds
and success and came up with contradictory results. On the one hand,
Howell et al. found that disclosing information regarding the use of
proceeds is positively associated with liquidity and volatility,
suggesting that ICOs have a self-incentive to disclose such
information. 226 On the other hand, Bourveau et al. found that
disclosing information regarding the use of proceeds does not affect
227
and Feng et al. found that it is negatively
successful completion,
2 28
associated with success.
Token allocation information disclosure: In their white papers,
ICOs generally feature information about token allocation-the

fraction of tokens allocated to founders, advisors, early investors, etc.
On the one hand, Daniel Blaseg found that disclosing token allocation
229
On
predicts success, suggesting that it reduces ex ante uncertainty.
the other hand, however, Bourveau et al. found that disclosing

221. Chen Feng, Nan Li, M.H. Franco Wong & Mingyue Zhang, Initial Coin
Offerings, Blockchain Technology, and White Paper Disclosures 28 (Mar. 25, 2019)
author),
with
file
(on
manuscript)
(unpublished
3 2 62 89
[https://perma.cc/Q3KV5
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
ZT5X] (archived Feb. 16, 2020).
222. See Id. at 6; Lyandres et al., supra note 9, at 23.
223. Anne Wyatt, Is There Useful Information in the 'Use of Proceeds'Disclosures
in IPO Prospectuses?, 54 AccT. & FIN. 625, 626 (2014).
224. See, e.g., Andrew J. Leone, Steve Rock & Michael Willenborg, Disclosure of
Intended Use of Proceeds and Underpricing in InitialPublic Offerings, 45 J. ACCT. RES.
111, 141 (2007).
225. Bourveau et al., supra note 118, at 42-45 (finding that forty-five percent of
failed and forty-nine percent of completed ICOs have disclosed information about use of
proceeds); Adhami et al., supra note 7, at 7 (finding that only 30.8 percent of ICOs have
disclosed information about use of proceeds).
226. Howell et al., supranote 89, at 29.
227. Bourveau et al., supra note 118, at 45.
228. Feng et al., supra note 221, at 5, 39.
229. Daniel Blaseg, Dynamics of Voluntary Disclosure in the Unregulated Market
for Initial Coin Offerings 22 (Oct. 3, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Soc.
Sci. Research Network).
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information about token allocation is negatively associated with the
amount raised, 2 30 and Feng et al. found it to be negatively but
insignificantly (in most specifications) associated with ICO success. 23 1
The former may indicate that token allocation is often not optimal, and
hence if ventures disclose information about it, it negatively affects the
fundraising. The latter result may indicate that investors do not value
this type of disclosure.
Information about the initiators:A growing body of literature in
the IPO context examines the role of the management team as a signal.
The rationale for focusing on social indicators-such as information

about the initiators-is that "investors who are unable to discern the
venture's quality from economic disclosure turn to more social
indicators." 23 2 Therefore, the focus on social indicators is greater in the
presence of market uncertainty. 233 Empirical studies support the
proposition regarding the management team's importance as a signal,
showing a significant and positive relationship between management
characteristics-such as management team legitimacy, team size,
education, and prior industry experience-and venture financial

performance. 234
Considering the high market uncertainty in ICOs, we would
expect team characteristics to be an important indicator. Several
studies have examined the association between ICO success and
information disclosed about (1) the team in general; (2) team members'

reputations and experiences; and (3) team size. First, Bourveau et al.
found that simply disclosing biographical information about the team
is negatively associated with crash risks in the long term and with
illiquidity and positively correlated with the amount raised. 235
Similarly, Blaseg found that simply disclosing the number of team
members increased the probability of listing, 236 suggesting that

investors value information about the team. However, Feng et al. found
that disclosing the number of team members in the white paper does
not affect ICO success. 23 7 Second, Bourveau et al. showed that
investors value team members' reputations, finding that the number
of team members previously involved in a successful ICO is associated

230. Bourveau et al., supra note 118, at 44.
231. Feng et al., supra note 221, at 49.
232. Cohen & Dean, supranote 13, at 684-686.
233. See generally Joel M. Podolny, Market Uncertainty and the Social Character
of Economic Exchange, 39 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 458, 459 (1994) ("in order to avoid the problems
posed by market uncertainty and forestall market failure, organizations adopt a more
social orientation").
234. For an overview of this area of the empirical literature, see Cohen & Dean,
supra note 13, at 685.
235. Bourveau et al., supra note 118, at 46.
236. Blaseg, supra note 229, at 20.
237. Feng et al., supra note 221, at 39.
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with success. 2 38 In line with this result, Momtaz found that CEOs' prior
experience in crypto-related projects is positively associated with firstday return, which suggests that investors are aware of founders'
240
reputations. 239 Howell et al. found that entrepreneurial experience

is strongly associated with success, but they also found that experience
in finance, crypto, or computer science is not. 241 Interestingly, Amsden
and Schweizer found that having a well-connected CEO (i.e., a CEO
with over five hundred links on LinkedIn) is positively associated with
the amount raised. 242 Third, the size of the team is associated with
success. 243 Overall, consistent with our expectations, these results
suggest that team characteristics are important signals. Having said
that, in practice, many ICOs provide misleading or no information
244
about their initiators.
2. Source Code Disclosure
Prior to launch, ventures generally disclose their underlying code
24 5
Most empirical
on an online code repository (mainly GitHub).
studies found that source code disclosure is positively and significantly
2 46
with liquidity and
associated with successfully completing the ICO,

238. Bourveau et al., supra note 118, at 46.
239. See Moral Hazard, supra note 11, at 31. Interestingly, he also found that
CEOs' prior experience in crypto-related projects is positively associated with project
failure ("defined as events in which tokens are delisted from all exchange platforms")
(see id. at 18). His suggested explanation "is that many CEOs had prior projects that
failed, which might send a negative signal" (see id. at 31).
240. Howell et al., supra note 89, at 23 (a dummy variable that equals 1 if the
founder claims on Linkedln to have previously founded a company).
241. Id. at 3.
242. Amsden & Schweizer, supra note 188, at 64.
243. Abe De Jong, Peter Roosenboom & Tom van der Kolk, What Determines
Success in Initial Coin Offerings? 18 (Sept. 15, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
2
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3 50
author),
with
[https://perma.cc/K79A-CRRH] (archived Feb. 16, 2020); Amsden & Schweizer, supra
note 188; Bourveau et al., supra note 118, at 44; Lyandres et al., supra note 9, at 45.
Burns & Moro find that team size is negatively associated with ROI, but positively
associated with the amount raised. See Lauren Burns & Andrea Moro, What Makes an
ICO Successful? An Investigation of the Role of ICO Characteristics, Team Quality and
Market Sentiment 25 (Sept. 27, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author),
[https://perma.cc/PK95-EZVC]
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3256512
(archived Feb. 16, 2020).
244. See Zetzsche et al., supra note 82, at 15.
245. See generally Amsden & Schweizer, supra note 188 (finding that forty-eight
percent of ICOs disclosed their source-code on GitHub); Adhami et al., supra note 7
(finding that forty percent of ICOs disclosed their source code); Howell et al., supra note
89 (finding that sixty-six percent of ICOs disclosed their source code); Fisch, supra note
16 (finding that sixty-seven percent of ICOs disclosed their source code).
246. See, e.g., Bourveau et al., supra note 118, at 46; Adhami et al., supra note 7,
at 9.
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volatility, 2 47 with the amount raised, 24 8 and with the probability of
having tradable tokens after ICO completion. 249 Adhami et al.

suggested that source code disclosure allows potential investors to
preassess the technical validity of the project, and thus it is an
important signal. 25 0 In contrast, Fisch found that source code
disclosure does not predict success, but only the quality of the code

(measured by the number of defect fixed in GitHub). 25 1 He suggested
that high quality code signals high technological capabilities. 2 52 In line
with this, Rhue found that the number of bugs in the token code,
identified by Etherscan, is negatively and significantly associated with
market cap; 2 53 Howell et al. found a negative relation between days
from last commit (revision) and'liquidity, which suggests that being

active on GitHub is a positive signal for potential investors; 254 and
Blaseg also found source code quality, measured in accordance with
BetterCodeHub Guidelines on Maintainable Software, strongly
predicts ICO success. 25 5

Ironically, while investors tend to be highly sensitive to source
code disclosure and quality, Shaanan Cohney et al. empirically showed
significant mismatches between promises made in white papers and

the actual code, and that the number of uncoded promises does not
affect ICO success. 25 6 This implies that investors either do not review
the source code or are unable to assess its quality. In the long term,

however, they found a negative correlation between price appreciation
and the number of uncoded promises, 257 suggesting that information

asymmetry decreases as time goes by. A potential interpretation for
these results is that when an ICO raises a large amount of money, it

attracts attention from independent parties (or competitors), who
assess its underlying code and then post their findings on social
media.258

247. See, e.g., Howell et al., supra note 89, at 44.
248. See, e.g., De Jong et al., supra note 243, at 4.
249. See, e.g., Amsden & Schweizer, supra note 188, at 43.
250. Adhami et al., supra note 7, at 7.
251. Fisch, supra note 16, at 7-8.
252. Id.
253. Rhue, supra note 9, at 20.
254. Howell et al., supra note 89, at 39.
255. Blaseg, supra note 229, at 14.
256. See generally Cohney et al., supra note 26.
257. Id. at 613.
258. This interpretation corresponds with Bourveau et al, who found that source
code disclosure is positively correlated with crash risks in the long term. They suggest
that by disclosing the source code, ICOs enable other ventures to imitate their
technology, and therefore may lose their competitive advantage. See Bourveau et al.,
supra note 118, at 40.
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3. Social Media and Marketing
Social media platforms play a vital role in ICOs. While firms
launching an IPO generally use social media to raise awareness for the
project, in the case of ICOs vital information like launch
announcements, or the start of trading, is often publicized on social

media.2 5 9 The importance of social media could be attributed to the
information asymmetry associated with ICOs. 260 Presence on social
media sites enables potential investors to communicate directly with
the entrepreneurs, and thus reduces the uncertainty around the
project. 261 Empirical studies show that most ICOs are indeed very
active on social media platforms. Rhue found that every ICO has a
median of eight social media links 262 and Howell et al. found that 87
percent (97 percent) of ICOs have a Telegram group (Twitter account)
26 3
with an average of over five thousand (22,200) members (followers).
Social media activity and presence predict ICO success: Empirical
studies analyzed the relation between social media and different

aspects of ICOs and found that social media presence and activity are
among the major factors that influence ICO success. Bourveau et al.
found that social media activity, an indicator measured by ICOBench,
is negatively associated with illiquidity, and positively and reliably
associated with successfully completing an ICO and with the amount
raised for it.2 64 Benedetti and Kostovetsky found a positive
relationship between market capitalization and number of Twitter
followers, and that Twitter accounts with a longer record are
associated with success. 26 5 Amsden and Schweizer found that having
a Telegram group is positively and significantly correlated with the
probability of having tradable tokens after ICO completion and with
the amount raised. 266 Howell et al. found that the number of followers
on Twitter and Telegram is positively associated with liquidity, but
26 7
only the former is significantly correlated with long-term returns.
Fisch found that a higher level of Twitter activity during the ICO is

259. Chanson et al., supra note 168, at 13.
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. Rhue, supra note 9, at 35.
263. Howell et al., supra note 89, at 24.
264. Bourveau et al., supra note 118, at 25.
265. Benedetti & Kostovetsky, supra note 115, at 29-33, 36 (finding that accounts
with a longer record of activity are slightly more likely to be successful, with listed and
successful ICOs having an average Twitter age of 9.4 months (median of 4 months)
compared to unsuccessful ICOs with an average of 6.6 months. They also find that
stronger activity before the ICO, and especially during the ICO, is correlated with
success. However, increased tweeting during the ICO could be a result rather than the
cause of ICO success, as entrepreneurs are more likely to share good news about strong
token sales).
266. Amsden & Schweizer, supranote 188, at 33.
267. Howell et al., supra note 89, at 44.
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associated with a higher amount of funding raised (p<5%).2 68 Lauren
Burns and Andrea Moro found that the number of Twitter followers on

the ICO end date is positively correlated with ROI after four months
(p<5%) and with the amount raised (p<1%); they also found that the
growth in Twitter followers over the four-month period is positively
correlated with ROI (p<1%). 26 9 Similarly, Blaseg found that the
presence and activity of an ICO on social media, online forums (e.g.,
BitcoinTalk), and web traffic analytics platforms (e.g., Alexa rank)
predict success; 270 and Boreiko and Vidusso found that the logarithm
of total twitter followers before the start of the ICO campaign predicts
ICO success. 27 1 Interestingly, Lyandres et al., found that the level of
Twitter activity during the ninety days prior to the ICO is much higher
compared to the following ninety days after the end of the ICO. 2 72
Content from news website is less important in ICOs: earlier

studies have found that ventures can build legitimacy, which is
necessary to acquire financial resources, through media coverage in
secondary sources of information (e.g., newspapers). 273 In the context
of IPOs, the volume of media information that a venture received was
found to be negatively associated with underpricing. 274 This may imply
that media coverage reduces ex ante uncertainty and increases a
venture's legitimacy. 27 5 In contrast, in the case of ICOs, Mathieu
Chanson et al. found that crypto news prior to ICOs has no significant
effect on underpricing. 276 Similarly, Wolfgang Drobetz et al. found that
news articles have only a minor effect on ICOs, and a much smaller
influence compared to social media activity. 27 7 On the other hand,
Burns and Moro found that the number of news articles which mention
the token's name from two months prior to the ICO is positively and
significantly associated with the amount raised in the ICO. 278
However, they also found it to be negatively and significantly (p<1%)

268. Fisch, supranote 16, at 14.
269. Burns & Moro, supra note 243, at 25.
270. Blaseg, supranote 229, at 11.
271. Boreiko & Vidusso, supra note 204.
272. Lyandres et al., supra note 9, at 17.
273. See generally Timothy G. Pollock & Violina P. Rindova, Media Legitimation
Effects in the Market for Initial Public Offerings, 46 ACAD. MGMT. J. 631 (2003).
274. See id. at 639 (found that the volume of media-provided information is
negatively associated with underpricing and positively with stock turnover); Woan-Yuh
Jang, Media Exposure or Media Hype: Evidence from Initial Public Offering Stocks in
Taiwan, 20 J. MEDIA & ECON. 259, 259 (2007) (found that the "more media coverage a
firm receives over a substantial period of time prior to its IPO, the smaller the degree to
which its stock is underpriced").
275. Id.
276. Chanson et al., supra note 168, at 13.
277. See generally Wolfgang Drobetz, Paul P. Momtaz & Henning Schroder,
Investor Sentiment and Initial Coin Offerings, 21 J. ALTERNATIVE INV. 41 (2019).
278. Burns & Moro, supra note 243, at 22.
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correlated with the ROI after four months; 279 they suggest that this
2 80
can be explained by Merton's investor recognition hypothesis.

4. Presale
ICOs generally conduct private and public presales, which target
mainly institutional investors and VCs, and offer them discounts or
bonuses in exchange for taking more risk (investing in an early
stage). 281 Empirical evidence shows that presales are a common
practice, 282 and that including them is positively and reliably
associated with liquidity and volatility, 283 with the amount raised,
2 84
and with the
with the probability of the token becoming tradeable,
likelihood of successfully completing the ICO (i.e., achieving the soft
cap). 2 85 As presales are strongly related to the presence of sophisticated
investors,2 86 these results suggest that potential investors regard
investments by sophisticated investors as a valuable signal.287 To put

&

279. Id. (However, they suggest that their result might be inaccurate as they did
not divide news articles into positive and negative news). Block et al., for example, find
that the type of information provided in updates plays an important role in the context
of equity crowdfunding. See J6rn Block, Lars Hornuf & Alexandra Moritz, Which
Updates During an Equity Crowdfunding Campaign Increase Crowd Participation?50
SMALL Bus. ECON. 15 (2018).
280. Robert C. Merton, A Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with
Incomplete Information, 42 J. FINANcE 483 (1987); Burns & Moro, supra note 243, at 22.
Merton Models informationally incomplete markets in which investors are not aware of
the number of securities available in each firm. He suggests that in this model, firms
that are recognized by fewer investors (determined by fewer news articles) need to
compensate their investors with higher returns. Based on this model, Burns and Moro
claim that an increase in the number of news articles that features the ICO leads to an
increase in investor recognition, and thus to a lower return compared to stocks with no
media coverage.
281. See Howell et al., supra note 89, at 12 (discussing the practice of presales).
282. Id. (finding that forty-five percent of the sample had a presale); Benedetti
Kostovetsky, supra note 115, at 44 (finding that forty percent of the sample had a
presale); Adhami et al., supra note 7, at 9 (finding that thirty-eight percent had a
presale); Zetzsche et al., supra note 82, at 7 (finding that twenty-two percent of the
sample had a presale, but suggesting that the actual number is higher, given the
information asymmetry associated with ICOs); Fisch, supra note 16, at 12 (finding that
sixty-five percent of the sample had a presale); Momtaz, Initial Coin Offerings, supra
note 106, at 35 (finding that forty-four percent had a presale).
283. Howell et al., supranote 89, at 30.
284. Lyandres et al., supra note 9, at 21.
285. Lee et al., supra note 18, at 17, 19 (finding that 39.5 percent of successful
ICOs included a presale, compared to 21.3 percent of failed ICOs; and that including a
presale can boost the success likelihood by 15.2 percentage points (p<1%)).
286. See Lyandres et al., supra note 9, at 21 ("the presale indicator is strongly
associated with the pres- ence of institutional or sophisticated investors".
287. See generally Jiasun Li & William Mann, Initial Coin Offerings and Platform
Building (Oct. 1, 2018) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author),
[https://perma.cc/L6SXhttps://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3088726
BR35] (archived Feb. 16, 2020) (presenting a theoretical model that rationalizes these
results. They show that given the multistage nature of ICOs, and that investors are
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it another way, presales are interpreted by later investors as evidence
that earlier investors held favorable information, and thus trigger an
information cascade. 288 This interpretation is consistent both with the
equity crowdfunding literature and with the IPO literature. 2 89

Interestingly, Benedetti and Kostovetsky found that presales have
become more popular over time, "with an average incidence of 1% for

ICOs completed before July 1, 2017, 29% for the second half of 2017
ICOs, and 57% for 2018 ICOs," 290 suggesting that issuers are learning
from past experience.
Other studies, on the other hand, have found that presales are
neither associated with success 29 1 nor negatively related to ICO
success. 292 A possible explanation, as Amsden and Schweizer
suggested, is that presales may indicate that a firm is insecure about
the ICO. 293 Another explanation is that, to attract sophisticated
investors, firms need to offer high bonuses during presales and as
discussed above, high bonuses may lead to pump-and-dump, as well as
Ponzi schemes. 294 Empirical evidence suggests that investors are
aware of these risks, so that offering bonuses-particularly high onespredicts failure and lower first-day returns on the secondary
market. 295 A possible explanation for the latter result, as Lee et al.
suggested, is that rational secondary market investors aware of the

heterogeneously informed, investors with a relatively high signal would join early and
those with a relatively weak signal would "follow the crowd").
288. See, e.g., Lee et al., supra note 18, at 5; Howell et al., supra note 89, at 30.
289. Lyandres et al., supranote 9, at 20. In the context of equity crowdfunding, see
generally Lars Hornuf & Armin Schwienbacher, Market Mechanisms and Funding
Dynamics in Equity Crowdfunding, 50 J. CORP. FIN. 556 (2018); In the IPO context, see
Ivo Welch, Sequential Sales, Learning, and Cascades,47 J. FINANCE 695 (1992) (develops
a model according to which, later potential investors can learn from the purchasing
decisions of earlier investors).
290. Benedetti & Kostovetsky, supra note 115, at 17.
291. See id. ("pre-ICOs do not seem to be correlated with success").
292. Amsden & Schweizer, supra note 188, at 33; Momtaz, Initial Coin Offerings,
supra note 106.
293. Amsden & Schweizer, supra note 188, at 18.
294. See Li & Mann, supra note 287, at 26; Amsden & Schweizer, supra note 188,
at 39 (discussing effects of bonuses); Bourveau et al., supra note 118, at 40.
295. Lee et al., supra note 18, at 3, 17 (find that high bonuses (>20%) are more
prevalent in failed ICOs (p<0.1); that ICOs offering large bonuses are 10.9 percentage
points less likely to succeed; that high bonuses negatively predict the total amount raised
in an ICO, are negatively correlated with first-day sales volumes, and have a
significantly lower first-day return than that for token sales without large bonuses).
Bourveau et al., supra note 118, at 44 (finding that offering bonuses and bounties is
negatively associated with the amount raised, and that this is positively associated with
extremely negative returns in the long term (less than or equal to -75%)). On the other
hand, Amsden & Schweizer, supra note 188, at 38, find that the offering of presale
bonuses is not significantly correlated with either the probability of the token's
tradability or the amount raised.
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bonuses would demand a lower price, closer to the tokens' intrinsic

value. 29 6
C. Token Sale Design Choices
1. Blockchain and Token Types
Type of blockchain: ICOs can either develop their own blockchain
or launch their tokens on an existing platform, such as Ethereum or
Bitcoin. Most ICOs are currently launched on Ethereum and use the
standardized smart contract ERC20, 29 7 a "token standard [that]
describes the functions and events that an Ethereum token contract
has to implement." 298 A possible reason for the popularity of this
protocol is that it ensures the interoperability of different tokens.
Tokens issued under this protocol can interact with smart contracts on
the Ethereum platform, and with every wallet that supports
Ethereum-based tokens. 299 Another reason may be that ERC20
simplifies the process of issuing a new token, enabling anyone to issue
a new token using less than one hundred lines of code.300
Investors value the Ethereum standard: empirical studies
examined the association between the type of blockchain and ICO
success and found that investors value the Ethereum standard.
Momtaz found that using ERC20 is positively related to the amount
raised and with first-day return. 3 0 1 Fisch found that launching an ICO
30 2
on Ethereum is positively associated with the amount raised.
Similarly, Amsden and Schweizer found that launching an ICO on
Ethereum is positively correlated with the probability of having
tradable tokens after ICO completion. 303 However, they also found it is
negatively correlated with the amount raised. 304 A possible reason for
the latter result is that large ICOs may prefer to create their own
305
In
blockchain due to limitations in the functionality of Ethereum.
line with this interpretation, Howell et al. found that creating a new

296. Lee et al., supra note 18, at 26.
297. Adhami et al., supra note 7, at 6 (finding that fifty-six percent of the sample
use Ethereum); Amsden & Schweizer, supra note 188, at 32 (finding that over eightyfive percent of the sample use Ethereum); EY 2017, supra note 114, at 19 (finding that
seventy-seven percent of the sample use Ethereum); Fisch, supra note 16, at 12 (finding
that seventy-eight percent of the sample use Ethereum); Howell et al., supra note 89, at
23 (finding that seventy-four percent of the sample use ERC20); Lee et al., supra note
18, at 13 (finding that seventy-eight percent of the sample use Ethereum); Rhue, supra
note 9, at 19 (finding that nearly eighty-five percent of the sample use Ethereum).
298. ERC20, supra note 68.
299. Robinson, supra note 20, at 958 n.349.
300. See Rohr & Write, supra note 26, at 474 (describing the benefits of ECR20).
301. Momtaz, Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 106, at 34.
302. Fisch, supra note 16, at 14.
303. Amsden & Schweizer, supra note 188, at 33.
304. Id. at 37.
305. Id.
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blockchain protocol is among the strongest predictors of liquidity, and
that it is also positively associated with higher returns on the
secondary market. 306 Their suggested explanation is that ventures

that launch a token on a native blockchain ensure that the token value
is correlated, at least in theory, with the platform value. 307 Another
possible explanation is that creating a new protocol signals high
technical expertise.
Type of token: A token may represent a variety of rights, ranging

from financial to consumptive rights. Empirical studies show that the
most common type is utility token. 308 Empirical studies also examine
whether token type affects its success probability. Adhami et al.
hypothesized that the rights attached to the token matter, because

they contribute to the question of whether the token qualifies as a
security. 3 09 They found empirical evidence that partly supports their
hypothesis, showing that only the right to access a service (utility

token) and profits rights are associated with success (significant at 99
percent and 95 percent, respectively).

310

Howell et al. found that tokens

that convey utility-like rights are more likely to succeed. 311 Fisch,
however, analyzed the relation between utility token-a dummy
variable measured manually based on the ICO's white paper-and ICO
success, and found no significant difference between security and
utility tokens with regard to the amount raised.3 1 2

2. Economic Variables
Fractionof tokens for sale: As in IPOs, a venture that launches an
ICO can decide how many tokens would be sold. Empirical studies

found that the average fraction of tokens for sale in an ICO is between
54 percent and 61 percent, 31 3 and that it is negatively and reliably

306. Howell et al., supra note 89, at 31.
307. See id.
308. See Adhami et al., supranote 7, at 8 (finding that sixty-eight percent of tokens
convey a right to access a service (utility token); 24.9 percent convey governance rights
(such as voting in decision polls); and 26.1 percent convey profit rights); Fisch, supra
note 16, at 12 (finding that eighty-three percent of the sample are utility tokens and
seventeen percent are security tokens); Howell et al., supra note 89 (find that sixty-eight
percent of tokens are utility tokens); Blaseg, supra note 229, at 29 (find that seventy-one
percent of tokens are utility tokens).
309. Adhami et al., supra note 7, at 7.
310. Id., at 7.
311. Howell et al., supra note 89, at 33.
312. Fisch, supra note 16, at 14.
313. Benedetti & Kostovetsky, supra note 115, at 25 (finding that the average
percent of all tokens sold during the ICO is 60); Howell et al., supranote 89, at 25 (finding
that the average percent is fifty-four); Lee et al., supra note 18, at 40 (fifty-seven percent
among successful and sixty-one percent among failed ICO); Amsden & Schweizer, supra
note 188, at 32 (sixty percent); Lyandres et al., supra note 9, at 15 (fifty-seven percent;
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associated with the probability of ICO success and with the amount
raised. 314 These results suggest that a higher fraction of tokens owned
by issuers signals that they are more committed to the project (have
more "skin in the game"). This is in line with Vismara's research (in
the context of equity crowdfunding), which found that entrepreneurs
who sell larger portions of their companies at listing are less likely to
315
This result is also
attract the interest of potential investors.

consistent with Richard Brealey's et al. argument (in the context of
IPOs) that the willingness of persons with inside information to invest
3 16
in the project signals quality.
Soft cap: When launching a token sale, a venture must decide
whether to include a soft cap requirement. A soft cap, as mentioned
3
earlier, is the minimum amount of funds aimed at by the ICO. 17 If an
ICO fails to reach the soft cap requirement, funds are usually returned
to investors. 31 8 Therefore, a soft cap requirement reduces investor risk.
Empirical studies found, however, that soft cap requirements are not
very common. 319 They also examined the association between
including a soft cap requirement and determinants of ICO success and
found contradictory results. 320 Lee et al. found that the average
(median) soft cap for successful ICOs is $6.8 ($2.7) million, similar to
that set by unsuccessful ICOs, suggesting that having a soft cap does
not affect ICO success. 32 1 Similarly, Rhue and Blaseg found that it has
322
Bourveau et al. found that
no significant effect on ICO success.
including a soft cap requirement is negatively and significantly

associated with the amount raised and with successfully completing
the fundraising; 323 and Abe De Jong et al. found that the soft cap target

in ten percent of the ICOs all tokens are offered to ICO investors); Fisch, supra note 16,
at 11 (fifty-six percent).
314. See Lee et al., supra note 18, at 40; Amsden & Schweizer, supra note 188, at
32; Lyandres et al., supra note 9, at 15. On the other hand, however, De Jong et al., supra
note 243; Fisch, supra note 16, at 11; and Howell et al., supra note 89, at 25 found that
the association is not significant.
315. Silvio Vismara, Equity Retention and Social Network Theory in Equity
Crowdfunding, 46 SMALL BUS. EcON. 579, 588 (2016).
316. Richard Brealey, Hayne E. Leland & David H. Pyle, Informational
Asymmetries, FinancialStructure, and FinancialIntermediation,32 J. FINANCE 371, 371
(1977); see also Lowell W. Busenitz et al., Signaling in Venture Capitalist-New Venture
Team Funding Decisions: Does It Indicate Long-Term Venture Outcomes?, 29
ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAc. 1, 2 (2005) (describing the willingness of persons
with inside information in the context of venture capital).
317. See Lee et al., supra note 18, at 1.
318. See infra Part II.D.3.
319. Amsden & Schweizer, supra note 188, at 54 (finding that thirty-two percent
of the sample specify a soft cap requirement); Bourveau et al., supra note 118, at 18
(finding that thirty-nine percent of the sample specify a soft cap requirement).
320. Blaseg, supra note 229, at 31; Lee et al., supra note 18, at 16; Rhue, supra
note 9.
321. Lee et al., supra note 18, at 16.
322. Blaseg, supra note 229, at 31; Rhue, supra note 9.
323. Bourveau et al., supra note 135, at 44.
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amount is negatively associated with success. 3 24 On the other hand,
Amsden and Schweizer, Howell et al., and Fisch found that a soft cap
requirement is positively associated with the amount raised. 32 5
Hard cap: Similarly, a venture may decide whether to include a
hard or maximum cap requirement. Empirical studies found that the
average hard cap ranges from $43-$93 million, but the distribution is
highly skewed with a median value of $20-$23 million. 3 26 Studies also
suggest that ICOs tend to set high hard caps that they are unlikely to

reach, 327 and that a higher hard cap is negatively associated with ICO
success. 328 These results are in line with the theoretical and empirical
IPO literature, according to which large offerings send a negative
signal to the market. 329 Similarly, in the context of reward-based
crowdfunding, Ethan Mollick found that the funding goal is negatively
associated with success. 330 Conversely, in the case of equity
crowdfunding, Anna Lukkarinen et al. found that the fundraising
target is positively associated with the number of investors, but

insignificantly associated with the amount raised. 331 They suggest that
the difference between reward-based and equity crowdfunding is
rational as reward-based crowdfunding investors are interested in
obtaining a reward rather than a stake in the company. 332 It would be
interesting to see whether such a difference exists between utility and
security token sales.

324. De Jong et al., supra note 243, at 17.
325. Amsden & Schweizer, supra note213, at 37; Howell et al., supra note 89;
Fisch, supra note 16.
326. See Benedetti & Kostovetsky, supra note 115, at 16 (finding that the average
hard cap is approximately $43 million (median=$23 million)); Lee et al., supra note 18,
at 16 (finding that the average hard cap for successful ICOs is approximately $88 million
(median=$22 million)); Lyandres et al., supra note 9, at 15 (finding the mean hard cap is
$70 million, while in more than fifty percent of the ICOs, it is larger than $20 million,
highlighting that the distribution is skewed).
327. See Lee et al., supra note 18, at 8 (finding that only 12.2% of ICOs hit their
hard cap); Lyandres et al., supra note 9, at 16 (finding that ICOs are able to raise on
average forty-four percent of their hard cap, and only twenty-six percent of ICOs reach
the hard cap).
328. De Jong et al., supra note 243, at 17; Lyandres et al., supra note 9. But see
Lee et al., supra note 18, at 16 (finding that successful ICOs have on average a much
higher hard cap, but the median hard cap is very similar).
329. Lyandres et al., supra note 9, at 4 (citing Craig G. Dunbar & Stephen R.
Foerster, Second Time Lucky? Withdrawn IPOs That Return to the Market, 87 J. FIN.
EcoN. 610 (2008); Kathleen Weiss Hanley, The Underpricingof Initial Public Offerings
and the PartialAdjustment Phenomenon, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 231).
330. Ethan Mollick, The Dynamics of Crowdfunding:An Exploratory Study, 29 J.
BUS. VENTURING 1, 5 (2014).
331. Anna Lukkarinen et al., Success Drivers of Online Equity Crowdfunding
Campaigns, 87 DEcISION SUPPORT SYS. 26, 35 (2016).
332. Id.
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Currency accepted: The token sale is usually made through the
project website, wherein investors are required to transfer money
(either crypto or fiat currencies) to a smart contract address, which
333
then transfers a predetermined amount of tokens to the sender.
Empirical studies found that ICOs accept on average two types of
currencies. 3 34 Lee et al. found that ICOs that accept multiple
3 35
Considering the
currencies are significantly more likely to succeed.
volatile nature of cryptocurrencies, this result highlights the
importance of expanding payment options. Amsden and Schweizer
offered another interpretation, according to which, accepting multiple
cryptocurrencies requires significant technical expertise, and thus
signals quality. 3 36 Unsurprisingly, most ICOs accept Ether, and
accepting Ether has a stronger positive relation with liquidity and
33 7
volatility compared to accepting bitcoin.
ICOs sometimes accept fiat currencies, mainly USD. Some studies
found that accepting fiat currencies is correlated with a higher market
cap and amount raised, and negatively associated with long-term

failure

(i.e.,

being

delisted

from

exchanges). 338

A

possible

interpretation for these results is that ICOs that accept fiat currencies
339
Conversely, Amsden and Schweizer
reduce investors' entry barriers.
is negatively related to the
currencies
fiat
accepting
that
found
340
They suggest a twofold
tokens.
tradable
probability of having

333. See infra Part II.D.3.
334. Amsden & Schweizer, supra note 188, at 54 (finding that on average an ICO
accepts 1.6 different cryptocurrencies during the funding); Howell et al., supra note 89,
at 25.
335. Lee et al., supra note 18, at 3 (finding that (1) ICOs that accepted multiple
currencies were more likely to succeed (p<10%), compared to ICOs that accepted just one
currency; (2) and that accepting multiple currencies is significantly (p<1%) and
positively associated with higher gross proceeds). But see Blaseg, supra note 229, at 31
(finding that the number of accepted currencies do not affect success); De Jong et al.,
supra note 243, at 30 (finding that the number of accepted currencies does not affect
success).
336. Note that they refer to cryptocurrencies and not just currencies. See Amsden
& Schweizer, supra note 188, at 21.
337. Howell et al., supra note 89, at 25 (finding that only sixty-six percent of ICOs
accept Ether, and that accepting Ether has a stronger positive relation with liquidity
compared to accepting bitcoin); Rhue, supra note 9, at 14 (finding that ninety-four
percent of ICOs accept Ether, thirty-six percent accept bitcoin, and eleven percent accept
USD. Interestingly, she also finds that accepting bitcoin and Ether is positively
correlated with the amount raised, with the relation with the bitcoin being significant
(p<5%) and with Ether insignificant).
338. De Jong et al., supra note 243, at 17 (found that accepting fiat currencies
positively affect ICO success, but the coefficient is significant only in certain
specifications); Momtaz, Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 106 (found that accepting fiat
currencies is positively associated with gross proceeds and negatively with the
probability of being delisted); Rhue, supra note 9, at 20 (found that accepting USD is
positively associated with market cap (log-transformed market capitalization estimated
from the price on March 31, 2018)).
339. Momtaz, Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 106, at 20.
340. Amsden & Schweizer, supra note 188, at 34.
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explanation for this result. First, accepting fiat currencies may signal
issuers' lack of confidence to complete the ICO by crypto investors
only. 3 4 ' Second, it may expose the ICO to regulatory interventions, and
therefore increase the uncertainty around the project. 342 In line with
this interpretation, Momtaz found that ICOs that accept fiat currencies

go public on average 389 days later than ICOs that do not; he suggested
that in the early days, cryptocurrencies were not considered an asset
in most jurisdictions, and thus the regulatory effort associated with
accepting cryptocurrencies was less time consuming. 34 3

Token supply control: Unlike stock supply, token supply is
coded. 344 Therefore,

unless specific

code restrictions are applied,

issuers can control token supply, and dilute the value of a token
through new issuance. 345 Christian Catalini and Joshua S. Gans
theorized that, in order to maximize the amount raised in an ICO, the
growth rate in token supply between subsequent periods should be zero
(i.e., ICOs should have a predetermined token supply). 34 6 Consistent

with this theoretical model, Howell et al. found that the ability to create
future tokens is negatively correlated with the amount raised. 347
However, Cohney et al. found the over 20 percent of ICOs that made
promises regarding token supply in their sample of the top fifty ICOs
of 2017 by market capitalization failed to reflect these promises in the

actual code. 348
Token price and supply: A venture can freely determine token
supply, as well as the nominal price of each token. These decisions are
arbitrary as the venture can manipulate the nominal price by altering

the token supply, and they should not affect the overall market value
of the venture. 34 9 Nevertheless, empirical evidence suggests that these
factors play an important role in influencing the behavior of ICO
investors, with token supply being positively associated with ICO
success and token nominal price being negatively associated with ICO

341. Id. at 32-33.
342. Id.
343. Momtaz, Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 106, at 22.
344. Cohney, supra note 26, at 613 ("Cryptoassets are ...
created, limited, and
used up according to code").
345. Id.
346. Catalini & Gans, supra note 104, at 13.
347. Howell et al., supra note 89, at 31-32.
348. Cohney et al., supra note 26, at 29.
349. For example, a venture can freely decide whether to issue ten tokens with a
nominal price of ten or one-hundred tokens with a nominal price of one. See Malcolm
Baker, Robin Greenwood & Jeffrey Wurgler, Cateringthrough Nominal Share Prices, 64
J. FINANCE 2559, 2559 (2009) ("A firm's board of directors may choose to split to manage
the nominal share price and number of shares outstanding but cannot change its overall
market value through these means"); Justin Birru & Baolian Wang, Nominal Price
Illusion, 119 J. FIN. ECON. 578, 578 (2016) ("The level of a firm's stock price is arbitrary
as it can be manipulated by the firm via altering the number of shares outstanding").
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success. 35 0 A possible explanation for these results is that ICO
investors suffer from a nominal price illusion (i.e., that investors
overestimate the growth potential of low- compared to high-priced
tokens). 3 51 This is in line with the IPO literature, according to which
investors place higher valuations on low-priced shares, and therefore
352
managers respond by supplying shares at lower price levels.
Alternatively, these results may suggest that investors compare tokens
to bitcoin, and hence buy a high quantity of tokens, hoping that they
353
will reach a value similar to bitcoin.
Lock-up mechanism: A venture must decide whether early
contributors and founders would be required to commit to a lock-up
period, during which they would be prevented from selling their
tokens. The lock-up mechanism is designed to protect investors against
355
the threat of desertion. 354 Consistent with the IPO literature,
empirical studies found that reporting on having a lock-up mechanism

is positively correlated with ICO success, suggesting that lock-up is a
signal of quality.3 5 6 Therefore, ventures have an incentive to
implement such a mechanism. That said, Cohney et al. found that, in
practice, many ICOs make promises regarding lock-up mechanisms
35 7
They compared the
but fail to reflect them in the actual code.
promises made in the disclosure documents with the actual
functionality of the digital tokens for the top fifty ICOs that raised the
most capital in 2017, and found that of the thirty-seven ICOs that
358
These
promised a lock-up mechanism, 78 percent did not code it.
results highlight the information asymmetry associated with ICOs and
suggest that issuers exploit it.

Country restrictions: The token sale operates as a "worldwide
crowdfunding event," 359 but due to regulatory concerns, ICOs may
decide to exclude residents from certain countries. A recent empirical
study found that ICOs tend to exclude residents mainly from China
and the United States. 36 0 Empirical studies also analyze the relation
between country restrictions and determinants of ICO success. Lee et

350. Amsden & Schweizer, supra note 188, at 4; Benedetti & Kostovetsky, supra
note 115, at 4; De Jong et al., supra note 243, at 30-31 (the coefficients are significant
only in certain specifications); Fisch, supra note 16, at 12.
351. Benedetti & Kostovetsky, supra note 115, at 28.
352. Baker et al., supra note 349, at 2559; Birru & Wang, supra note 349, at 580.
353. Benedetti & Kostovetsky, supra note 115.
354. Cohney et al., supra note 26, at 614.
355. See Alon Brav & Paul A. Gompers, The Role of Lockups in Initial Public
Offerings, 16 REv. FIN. STUD. 1 (2003).
356. Blaseg, supra note 229, at 31; Bourveau et al., supra note 118; Feng et al.,
supra note 221, at 25; Howell et al., supra note 89, at 28-30.
357. Cohney et al., supranote 26, at 614-15.
358. Id.
359. Rohr & Wright, supra note 27, at 478.
360. Rhue, supra note 9, at 14 (found that thirty-three percent of the sample
exclude Chinese and twenty-seven percent exclude US citizens).
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al. found that restricted sales in certain countries are less likely to
succeed.3 6 1 Similarly, Momtaz found that the number of country
restrictions is positively associated with money on the table (an
additional restriction associated with an increase by $0.76 million). 36 2

This finding suggests that firms that choose to reduce the set of
potential investors need to offer higher incentives for the remaining.
However, he also found that ICOs that restrict countries are less likely

to fail (to be delisted).36 3 A possible reason for this is that by preventing
certain countries from participating the firm reduces the risk of
regulatory action. 364

Specifically, Bourveau et al. and Howell et al. analyze the
influence of restricting US investors.3 65 Bourveau et al. found that
ICOs that restrict US investors from participating are more likely to

be successfully completed and to raise more capital.3 6 6 In line with
Momtaz's interpretation, they suggest that this may reduce the risk of
future U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulation and
intervention, thereby increasing participation.3 6 7 On the other hand,
Howell et al. found that restricting US investors is unrelated to success
(higher liquidity and volatility).3 6 8
Preregistering: The decentralized nature of cryptocurrencies,
along with their anonymity, increase the risk of money laundering and
terrorism financing, 369 and hence know-your-customer (KYC) policies
are necessary for ICOs. 3 70 However, KYC policies are usually not
mandatory procedures. Empirical studies analyzed the association
between adopting KYC policies and determinants of ICO success and
found contradictory results. Lee et al. found evidence for a negative
influence of adopting KYC policies, both on successfully completing the
fundraising and on long-term returns. 371 They suggested that this
finding is not unexpected, as such policies have the potential of
reducing demand by investors who do not want to reveal their

361. Lee et al., supra note 18, at 393.
362. Momtaz, Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 106, at 21.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 22.
365. Bourveau et al., supra note 118, at 44; Howell et al., supra note 89.
366. Bourveau et al., supra note 118, at 44.
367. Id.
368. Howell et al., supra note 89, at 30.
369. Loi Luu, With Blockchain, Knowing Your Customer Is More Important Than
Ever, FORBES (May 15, 2018), www.forbes.com/sites/luuloi/2018/05/17/with-blockchainknowing-your-customer-is-more-important-than-ever/#d9c832c559cc
[https://perma.cc/8NZU-W8RU] (archived Nov. 6, 2019).
370. See Lyandres et al., supra note 9, at 15 (finding that forty-nine percent of
ICOs feature a KYC procedure and that thirty percent of ICOs feature a whitelist); Rhue,
supra note 9, at 14 (finding that forty-five percent of ICOs feature a KYC procedure).
371. Lee et al., supra note 18, at 40.
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identity. 3 72 Considering the cyber risks associated with the crypto
market, 373 it seems reasonable that investors hesitate to enter
sensitive personal data. On the other hand, Lyandres et al. and Burns
and Moro found that pre-ICO registration-whitelist or KYC policy374
These results may suggest
is positively related to the amount raised.
that adopting a KYC policy signals legitimacy. 375 Interestingly,
Momtaz documented a negative and significant relation between
376
He suggested
money left of the table and adopting of KYC policies.
that this result is consistent with information eliciting theories in
IPOs, according to which entrepreneurs get to know their potential
investors during the book-building period and can thus price their
377
tokens more accurately.
D. Token Sale Duration
The average duration of an ICO is from twenty-five to forty
days. 3 78 Empirical studies found that the duration of an ICO is
negatively related to success. Lee et al. found that successful ICOs took
an average of thirty days to complete, compared to 37.8 days for failed
37 9
fundraisers (the difference is significant at the 1 percent level).
Momtaz and Fisch found that the duration of an ICO is negatively
3 80
Similarly, De Jong et al. found
associated with the amount raised.
the ICO duration is negatively associated with token tradability and
the amount raised; 38 1 and Blaseg found that the announced duration
382
of the ICO is positively and significantly associated with success.
These results are in line with the crowdfunding literature. In the
context of reward-based crowdfunding, Mollick found that the duration

of crowdfunding is negatively associated with success and suggests
that a longer duration may signal lack of confidence in the project.383

372. Id. at 27.
373. EY 2017, supra note 114, at 32.
374. Burns & Moro, supra note 243; Lyandres et al., supra note 9, at 22.
375. Burns & Moro, supra note 243, at 25.
376. Momtaz, Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 106, at 21.
377. Id.
378. Adhami et al., supra note 7, at 7 (finding that the average duration is twentyseven days, but that it is heterogeneous with "some ICOs close in a few days, whereas
other are open for some months"); Benedetti & Kostovetsky, supra note 115, at 44
(finding that the average ICO lasts thirty-seven days (with a median of thirty-one). They
also find that this figure has recently been rising with an average of forty-one days for
2018 ICOs); Fisch, supra note 16, at 11 (finding that the average duration is twenty-five
days); Howell et al., supra note 89, at 42 (finding that the average duration of an ICO is
forty days).
379. Lee et al., supra note 18, at 18.
380. Fisch, supra note 16, at 14; Momtaz, Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 106,
at 4, 20.
381. De Jong et al., supra note 243, at 30-31.
382. Blaseg, supra note 229, at 20.
383. Mollick, supra note 330, at 8.
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Similarly, in the context of equity crowdfunding, Lukkarinen et al.
found that crowdfunding duration is negatively associated with the

number of investors (which is a proxy of campaign success) but not
related to the amount raised.38 4 They suggest that shorter durations
may encourage prospective investors to act fast.3 85

E. Post-ICO
1. Listing
After the token sale ends, ICOs generally list their tokens in
crypto exchanges, and the issued tokens are then traded on the
secondary market. Listing is an important indicator of ICO success, as
it provides the main source of liquidity.3 86 In particular, listing is
important for usage tokens, where a user must hold a token in order to
access a platform.3 8 7 Therefore, some empirical studies use a listing as
a proxy of ICO success3 8 8 and a delisting as a proxy of failure.3 8 9
Empirical studies found that the time from ICO completion to listing
is highly skewed, with some ICOs being listed during the token sales
and others over a year after ICO completion. The average ranges from

18.5-93 days. 390
Lyandres et al. found that a token is traded on average on five
different exchanges, and that the number of exchanges is positively
associated with success. 391 This suggests that exchanges are willing to
trade tokens of successful ICOs and that successful ICOs are willing to
pay listing fees. They also found that larger ICOs are more likely to be
listed, which makes sense, as listing is costly. 392

384. Lukkarinen et al., supra note 331, at 35.
385. Id. at 35.
386. Momtaz, Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 106, at 10.
387. Amsden & Schweizer, supra note 188, at 14.
388. Id. at 13-14; Lyandres et al., supra note 9, at 19.
389. Lyandres et al., supra note 9, at 19; Momtaz, Initial Coin Offerings, supra
note 106, at 21.
390. Benedetti & Kostovetsky, supra note 115, at 19 (finding that the average
(median) time is 31 (16) days and that some ICOs were listed prior to the end of the ICO);
Lee et al., supra note 18, at 25 (finding that the average time from ICO completion to
listing is 18.5 days); Momtaz, Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 106, at 3 (average
(median) time of 93 (42) days).
391. Lyandres et al., supra note 9, at 16, 23.
392. Id. at 22, 27.
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2. Underpricing
Underpricing is a phenomenon whereby the price of an asset is on
39 3
This phenomenon has been
average lower than its issuance price.

observed by many researchers in the context of IPOs, and various
explanations have been offered for it. Some studies suggested that
information asymmetry between the issuer and potential investors can
394
Other studies theorized
explain IPO underpricing, at least in part.
that the information asymmetry between the issuer firm and the
395
Some scholars also
underwriter can explain this phenomenon.
39 6
For
suggested that firms intentionally underprice their stock.
example, Rajesh K. Aggarwala et al. argued that managers
strategically underprice their stocks in order to generate a higher price
at the lock-up expiration, 397 and Ivo Welch argued that high-quality
firms underprice their stocks to obtain a higher price at a seasoned
8
offering. 39
Empirical studies found significant evidence of underpricing in
3 99
Various
ICOs, and in a larger degree than compared to IPOs.
theoretical explanations were offered for this phenomenon in the
context of ICOs. Momtaz, for example, argued that ICOs have an
incentive to underprice their token to generate market liquidity, which
4 00
This argument is consistent
is an important signal for investors.
with Lyandres's et al. finding that liquidity is increasing in ICO
underpricing 4 01 and with Howell et al. who suggested that in the
absence of measures of commercial success, liquidity is a major signal
4 02
Momtaz also argued
of ICO quality from early investors' perspective.
that ICOs with a native token have an incentive to underprice their
token to attract a large user base, as the value of the token is partially
determined by network size. 40 3 Cong et al. developed a theoretical

393. Thijn Felix, Underpricing in the Cryptocurrency World: Evidence from Initial
Coin Offerings 7 (June 1, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author),
[https://perma.cc/2V99https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3202320
HGS7] (archived Nov. 11, 2019).
394. See Kevin Rock, Why New Issues are Underpriced, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 187
(1986) (finding that information asymmetry can explain IPO underpricing). See also
Felix, supranote 393, at 7-10 (provides a further review of IPO underpricing literature).
395. See David P. Baron, A Model of the Demandfor Investment Banking Advising
and DistributionServices for New Issues, 37 J. FINANCE 955, 955 (1982).
396. See Rajesh K. Aggarwal et al., Strategic IPO Underpricing, Information
Momentum, and Lock Up Expiration Selling, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 105, 106-08 (2002).
397. Id. at 134.
398. Ivo Welch, Seasoned Offerings, Imitation Costs, and the Underpricing of
InitialPublic Offerings, 44 J. FINANCE 421, 421 (1989).
399. See Table 4 in the Appendix.
400. Momtaz, Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 106, at 14.
401. Lyandres et al., supra note 9, at 6.
402. Howell et al., supra note 89, at 30 (they also find that liquidity is positively
associated with the amount raised and with successfully completing the fundraising).
403. Momtaz, Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 106, at 9.
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model that supports this argument, according to which when a
platform has native token investors (users) join the platform not only

to enjoy its utility but also to benefit from the rising token price as a
result of the growing network size. 404

Momtaz, Benedetti and Kostovetsky, Lyandres et al. and Felix
analyzed the determinants of ICO underpricing. 405 Unsurprisingly,

Benedetti and Kostovetsky and Felix found that presales have a
significant negative influence on underpricing. 406 This result is
consistent with the argument of Howell et al. and Lee et al. that early
investment rounds provide an indication of the demand for the token,
thus helping determine an appropriate price for the launch of the
ICO. 40 7 Felix and Lyandres et al. found that the issue size of an ICO is
negatively and reliably associated with underpricing, suggesting that
larger ICOs are associated with a lower degree of information
asymmetry. 4 08 Conversely, Momtaz found that issue size is positively
associated with money left on the table. 409 Momtaz also found that
country restrictions are positively associated with money on the table,
suggesting that higher incentives are required for the remaining
potential investors. 410 Interestingly, in contrast with IPOs, Chanson et
al. and Benedetti and Kostovetsky found no significant association
between firm's age and underpricing. 41 1

IV. INFORMATION ASYMMETRY

This Part focuses on information asymmetry. It shows that a high
degree of information asymmetry exists in ICOs, and then outlines

three sources of informational asymmetries-the absence of standard
disclosure requirements,

investors'

lack of fundamental technical

knowledge, and projects' early stages of development during the
offering. 4 12 Subsequently, it discusses the role of signaling theory and
rating websites in mitigating these asymmetries.

404. Cong et al., supra note 121, at 28-29.
405. Benedetti & Kostovetsky, supra note 115, at 1; Felix, supra note 393;
Lyandres et al., supra note 9; Momtaz, Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 106, at 5.
406. Benedetti & Kostovetsky, supra note 115, at 4; Felix, supra note 393, at 29.
407. Howell et al., supra note 89, at 12; Lee et al., supra note 18, at 3.
408. Felix, supranote 393, at 29; Lyandres et al., supra note 9, at 27.
409. Momtaz, Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 106, at 4.
410. Id. at 20.
411. See Benedetti & Kostovetsky, supra note 115, at 5 (finding the reason for the
insignificant relation might be the use of a weak proxy: Twitter account age).
412. These sources were initially identified at Fisch, supra note 16, at 6. See also
Moral Hazard, supra note 11, at 6-7 (discussing four distinct origins of information
asymmetries in token sales).
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Information asymmetry is a condition associated with financial
markets, wherein potential investors lack information required to
4 13
Potentially, this may
assess the true quality of the financial product.
create a market for lemons, where high-quality companies will be
4 14
A growing body of literature has
deterred from entering the market.
4 15
VC, 4 16 and
discussed information asymmetry in the context of IPO,
4 17
In the context of IPOs, for example, "potential
crowdfunding.
investors possess substantially inferior knowledge relative to the
owner of the security." 4 18 While initiators have access to information
regarding the company's strategy and technology, potential investors
have access to relatively limited information. 4 19
The analysis presented in this Article suggests that a high degree
of information asymmetry exists in the context of ICOs; white papers
tend to be poor and misleading, but nevertheless, the ICO fundraising
success rate is considerably high. Below, the Article outlines three
42 0
potential sources of this information asymmetry.
disclosure
standard
to
subject
not
are
ICOs
First,
requirements. 421 While a company that launches an IPO faces
disclosure and registration requirements imposed by the securities
regulator, ICOs' disclosure requirements are unclear and depend on
their function as well as on the governing jurisdiction. 42 2 As a result,
there is uncertainty about what should be disclosed, and ventures
423
typically publish white papers that tend to be poor and misleading.
Second, investors often lack fundamental technical knowledge
42 4
Most ICOs are
required to assess the quality of the project.
blockchain-based ventures, and in order to understand their business

models, technological expertise

is required. 42 5 Investors' lack of

technical knowledge is thus a major source of information asymmetry.
In line with this, the analysis in Part III shows that while investors
tend to be highly sensitive to the technical aspects of the project, and

413. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11; Moral Hazard, supra note 11, at 6-7.
414. Akerlof, supra note 12, at 489-90.
415. Cohen & Dean, supra note 13.
416. See Gilson, supra note 14 (discussing information asymmetry in the context
of venture capitalists).
417. Ahlers et al., supra note 15, at 6, 19.
418. Cohen & Dean, supra note 13, at 683-84.
419. Id.
420. The discussion here relies on Fisch, supra note 16, at 6; Moral Hazard, supra
note 11, at 6-7.
421. Fisch, supra note 16, at 6.
422. Lee et al., supra note 18, at 7; OECD, supra note 108, at 26. For an overview
of the top twenty-five ICO jurisdictions in market capitalizations and their comparative
regulatory responses, see generally Kaal, supra note 158.
423. Adhami et al., supra note 7, at 10; Cohney et al., supra note 26, at 5 (finding
mismatches between the underlying code and the promises disclosed in the white paper);
Zetzsche et al., supra note 82, at 34.
424. Fisch, supra note 16, at 6.
425. Id.
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specifically to source code disclosure, 42 6 they are insensitive to
mismatches between promises made in white papers and the actual

code, and that the number of uncoded promises does not affect the
amount raised. 42 7 This implies that investors either do not review the
source code or are unable to assess its quality.
Third, most ICOs are launched at a very early stage. A 2017 study
found that most ICOs are in the idea stage,
and their
platforms/services are expected to be launched in a year or more after
the ICO; 428 and a follow-up study found that "[a]bout a year after
raising money, only a small portion of ICO-funded start-ups have
progressed towards working product offerings." 42 9 Given that most

ICOs are launched at a very early stage, and lack track of records,
unsophisticated investors are unable to make an informed investment
decision. This is in contrast with IPOs, where a potential issuer will
have to "demonstrate a proper (and stable) amount of revenues, which

can only be achieved after a company has reached a certain level of

maturity." 430 This is partially due to exchanges and investment banks'
(which act as underwriters) listing requirements, which have a
tendency to select IPOs that have the potential to perform well after. 43 1
A. Reducing InformationAsymmetry through Signaling-Are

Investors Able to DistinguishBetween High- and Low-Quality Firms?Against that background, recent researchers have analyzed the
role of signaling theory in reducing the information asymmetry
associated with ICOs. 43 2 The signaling theory originally developed in

the context of labor markets and it examines how high-quality job
candidates can distinguish themselves from low-quality candidates. 43 3

426. See infra Part III.B.
427. Cohney et al., supra note 26, at 29.
428. EY 2017, supra note 114, at 16.
429. EY Study: Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) The Class of 2017-one year later,
ERNST & YOUNG 6 (2018), https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-study-icoresearch/$FILE/ey-study-ico-research.pdf [https://perma.cc/PT8T-X64F] (archived Nov.
11, 2019).
430. Collomb et al., supra note 78, at 296-97.
431. Id.
432. See Fisch, supra note 16 (study examining the role of signaling ventures'
technological capabilities in ICOs).
433. See Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. EcON. 355, 355-61 (1973)
(outlining the signaling theory as it applies to labor markets). In the context of IPOs, see
Trevis Certo et al., SignalingFirm Value Through Board Structure:An Investigation of
Initial Public Offerings, 26 ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THEORY & PRAC. 33, 36 (2001)
(explaining the application of signaling theory to the incentives a firm's board of directors
has at the IPO stage). In the context of crowdfunding, see Ahlers et al., supranote 15, at
956-57, 958-64 (describing how signaling theory works in crowdfunding ventures). In
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In the context of financial markets, signaling theory examines how
high-quality ventures can distinguish themselves from low-quality
434
firms by sending signals about venture's true quality.
Given the high variation in ICOs' quality, high-quality ICOs are
incentivized to send signals about the venture's true quality, so that
potential investors will be able to distinguish between them and lowquality ICOs. 4 3 5 The rest of this subpart examines how firms can signal
quality in the context of ICOs.
First, ICOs may signal quality through voluntary disclosure. Past
studies in the context of equity funding found that firms are
incentivized to provide information voluntarily to reduce information
asymmetry. 4 36 The rationale here is that low-quality ventures might
be deterred from providing information about the ICO, whereas highquality ICOs might be willing to provide additional information.
Therefore, providing more extensive information in the white paper
43 7
may signal quality.
Empirical studies analyzed whether ICOs can signal quality by
providing more extensive information; however, results were
inconsistent. While the majority of ICOs publish a white paper, most
studies found that simply disclosing a white paper does not affect ICO
success. 4 38 However, empirical evidence suggests that proxies of white
paper's quality (e.g., number of words, pages, and unique words)
predict success, suggesting that investors value the quality of the

the context of ICOs, see Fisch, supranote 16, at 5-8 (discussing how signaling theory can
apply to the ICO market).
434. In order for the signals to be effective, they must be observable by potential
investors and costly to imitate. See Brian L. Connelly et al., Signaling Theory: A Review
and Assessment, 37 J. MGMT. 39, 47-50 (2011) (listing several sources stating that the
observability and costliness of signals are important for them to be successful).
435. See id. at 40 (explaining the incentives signaling theory creates in general);
Fisch, supra note 16, at 11, 18 (briefly describing some of the disparities in ICOs and
showing findings that demonstrate what signals ICOs may use to effectively indicate
quality to investors).
436. See Feng et al., supra note 221; see also Richard Frankelet al., Discretionary
Disclosureand ExternalFinancing, 70 AccT. REV. 135. 136-37, 140-49 (1995) (divulging
findings that show that firms make earnings forecasts as a tool to communicate with
investors); Leone et al., supra note 252, at 118-48 (examining the correlation between
disclosure of proceeds usage and initial IPO returns, and finding that disclosure tends
to help avoid underpricing).
437. However, to ensure that low-quality ICOs will be deterred from providing
misleading information, they must face penalties in the event of fraudulent disclosure.
See Patricia J. Hughes, Signalling by direct disclosure under asymmetric information, 8
J. AccT. & ECON. 119, 121-37 (1986) (making findings that demonstrate how having a
penalty set for inaccurate disclosures should incentivize truthful disclosures); see also
De Jong et al., supranote 243, at 8 (stating, based on Hughes' findings, that low-quality
ICOs are less likely to share information with investors when they may incur a penalty
for that information being fraudulent).
438. See infra Part III.B.1 (examining several studies about the effects of white
paper disclosure).
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information disclosed in white papers. 43 9 In line with this, De Jong et
al. found that ICOs with a higher transparency rating (i.e., that
disclose more extensive information) according to ICOBench are more
likely to succeed,4 4 0 and Bourveau et al. found that ICOs with
informative white papers according to ICOBench are more likely to

succeed.4 4 1
However, when Bourveau et al. manually analyzed the association
between disclosure practices (ICO team information, token allocation

information, founder tokens vesting period, use of proceeds, white
paper opacity, and white paper length) and ICO success they found no
significant association, which may suggest that ICOBench disclosure

indicators are not entirely accurate.44 2 This is also in line with the
contradictory effect of disclosing information about the use of proceeds
and token allocations. The lack of clear positive effect with regard to
these indicators may suggest that investors do not fully assess the
information disclosed in white papers. Therefore, the effect of
providing more extensive information in white papers is not entirely
clear.

Second, due to the complex technological nature of ICOs, some'
have argued that ICOs can signal quality through technological
capabilities.44 3 In line with this argument, empirical evidence suggests
that disclosing a technical white paper and the amount of technical,
language in the white paper predict successful fundraising. 4 44
However, Feng et al. found that the amount of technical discussion in
white papers predicts success only for high-quality ICOs. 44 5 A possible

439. See id. (explaining data that demonstrates how the quality of information
white papers disclose relate to the success of an ICO).
440. See De Jong et al., supra note 243, at 18 (concluding that higher ratings for
ICOs correlate with stronger performance).
441. See Bourveau et al., supra note 118, at 32-33, 47-48, 54 (finding that (1)
completed ICOs tend to have significantly higher ratings than failed ICOs; (2) rating is
positively associated with the likelihood of completing an ICO; (3) higher ratings are
strongly negatively associated with two measures of crash risk, extreme negative returns
and negative return skewness; and (4) higher ratings are negatively associated with
post-ICO illiquidity and return volatility).
442. See id. at 2, 18-20, 44 (finding no substantial correlation between ICO
disclosure practices and the ultimate success of an ICO).
443. See, e.g., Feng et al., supra note 221, at 22-29 (reporting findings about the
effect of the quality of blockchain technology an ICO uses on investors and the success
of the ICO); Fisch, supranote 16, at 12-14, 18 (discussing findings regarding how various
indicators of technological capabilities serve as effective signals to investors).
444. See Fisch, supra note 16, at 12-14, 18 (explaining the effectiveness of
technical white papers as signals); Lyandres et al., supra note 9, at 19-20, 50 (showing
and summarizing data demonstrating that white papers with more technical language
are more effective for ICO success).
445. See Feng et al., supra note 221, at 5-6 (finding that white paper technical
discussion increases the amount raised for ICOs with high blockchain ratings, but that
the same does not hold true for those with low blockchain ratings).
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interpretation for this is that projects are more likely to provide
technical discussions in the white paper when they are in more
advanced stages. 44 6
Another important signal on that matter is ventures' source codes.
Almost all the empirical studies analyzed in this Article found that

disclosing a source code on GitHub prior to the ICO predicts success.4 4 7
Source code disclosure allows potential investors to preassess the
44 8
technical validity of the project, and thus it is an important signal.
Likewise, most empirical papers found that proxies of source code
quality predict success, suggesting the quality of the source code is
9
associated with the value of the ICO. 44 However, it seems that
investors are only sensitive to "surface" technical signals and are

unable to assess the true quality of the code. 4 50 While disclosing the
source code and proxies of code quality, like being active on GitHub,
predicts success, mismatches between the source code and promises
45 1
This may
made in the white paper do not affect fundraising success.
suggest the investors review the source codes but are unable to
evaluate their true quality, or, alternatively, it is possible that
investors are relying on intermediaries, which only assess "surface"
indicators regarding the quality of the code.

With respect to the use of blockchain technology, empirical
evidence suggests that investors are able to distinguish between ICOs
that leverage blockchain technology and ICOs that don't really need to
use blockchain, 4 52 and see the Ethereum standard as a valuable signal.
Third, due to the lack of legal protection to ICO investors, coupled
with the large amount of fraudulent ICOs, ventures may signal quality
by implementing practices intended to protect investors. Obviously,
empirical papers found that ICOs that state that they will implement

446. See id.; Lyandres et al., supra note 9, at 12-13 (choosing to measure technical
language in white papers on the thought that technical white papers come about from
more developed ICO projects).
447. See infra Part II.B.2 (analyzing the results of studies on how source code
disclosure affects ICO success); infra Table 2 in the Appendix (organizing the findings of
several studies into categories based on how it determined certain variables affect ICO
success).
448. See Adhami et al., supra note 7, at 7 (acknowledging the potential disclosing
source code has for allowing potential investors to scrutinize an ICO).
449. See infra Part III.B.2 (listing various studies showing that certain indicative
factors relating to source code quality correlate with ICO success).
450. See, e.g., Cohney et al., supra note 26, at 639-47 (finding that ICOs that made
code promises in its white paper but did not actually include them in the code had similar
fundraising outcomes to those that did); supra Part III.B.2 (noting that some investors
seem to rely mostly on the promises about the source code in white papers as opposed to
reading the actual code).
451. See Cohney et al., supra note 26, at 439-47 (listing the authors' findings that
whether or not promises appeared in code did not affect ICO fundraising success); supra
Part III.B.2 (describing the findings of Cohney et al., supra note 26).
452. Feng et al., supra note 221, at 25-26 (reporting findings about the differences
in amounts raised that tend to show that investors can tell when an ICO uses blockchain
and when others do not).
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lockup mechanisms and restrict the ability to create future tokens are

more likely to succeed. 453 However, such statements were found to be
false in certain cases. 454 Surprisingly, the effect of including a soft cap
is unclear. 455 This result is surprising, because most ICOs implement
an "all or nothing" mechanism, and hence the presence of a soft cap
reduces investors' risks. 456 Additionally, consistent with IPOs and
crowdfunding, a higher fraction of tokens owned by issuers is
associated with success, suggesting that it signals "skin in the
game." 457 Empirical studies also analyze the effect of adopting a KYC
mechanism and came with conflicting results. This result is not
entirely surprising; while KYC potentially may signal legitimacy,
investors might be hesitant in providing private information, due to a
large amount of cybersecurity incidents occurring in the blockchain
industry. 45 8
In line with the contradictory results outlined here, empirical
evidence suggests that investors are not entirely sensitive to disclosure

about risk and regulation. 459 Most ICOs do not specify the applicable
law and jurisdiction, and the presence of such information has only a
minor effect on ICO success. 4 60 While these results are surprising, it is
possible that ventures were unable to specify the applicable law and

jurisdiction due to regulatory uncertainty. Additionally, Feng et al.
found that most ICOs do not disclose information related to the
project's risks and that such disclosure does not affect ICO success. 461
Combined, these results suggest that investors are not entirely
sensitive to risk and regulation related information.

453. See infra Part III.C.2 nn.387-88 (citing several sources reflecting how lockup
mechanisms positively affect the success of an ICO).
454. See, e.g., Cohney et al., supra note 26, at 638-43 (reporting data showing that
ICO projects that promise lockup in their white papers will frequently not actually
encode it into the ICO).
455. See infra Part III.C.2 (describing several studies that reached contradictory
conclusions about the effect of including a soft cap in an ICO).
456. See id. (stating how most ICOs return funds to investors if they fail to reach
their soft caps).
457. See id. (looking at several studies and determining that investors react
positively to token issuers owning a significant portion of the tokens in a project).
458. See id. (noting the various findings of several conflicting studies and the
reasons results could come out either way).
459. See supra Part III.B.1. (pointing out that even though most ICOs don't
disclose much, if any, applicable law or potential regulatory issues, most have been
successful anyway).
460. See id. (noting the infrequency of these types of disclosures and what the
continued success rate of ICOs may mean about how investors perceive that
information).
461. See Feng et al., supra note 221, at 39, 41 (giving datasets showing that a
majority of ICOs do not disclose risk information and that such nondisclosure is not an
impediment to the ICO succeeding).
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B. The Role of Rating Websites in Reducing Information Asymmetry
Considering the information asymmetry associated with ICOs,
analysts play a vital intermediary role. The absence of traditional
underwriters-who play a critical intermediary role in the IPO

market 46 2-coupled

with the complexity of this new technology,

increase the demand for information. Analysts, who are typically
equipped with in-depth knowledge about the industry, may screen
ICOs' disclosures and provide evaluations that are more accessible to
unsophisticated investors, for whom conducting due diligence on each
ICO might be too costly. It also has been suggested that ICO analysts
463
are "likely to be unbiased due to reputational concerns."
Empirical studies have analyzed the association between analysts'
rating and ICO success and found that analysts' rating from unofficial
4 64
Lee et al. found
websites strongly and reliably predicts ICO success.
that the rating provided by ICOBench is positively associated with the
amount of funds raised, successfully completing the ICO, quicker sale,
4 65
Bourveau et al.
and long-term returns on the secondary market.
found similar results when analyzing the rating scores from ICOBench
and ICORating, 4 66 and Rhue found that ICO Drops' reputation and
hype scores are positively and significantly associated with higher ROI,
and that ICO reputation scores from Etherscan predict a higher
market cap. 46 7 Similarly, Momtaz found that the quality of the
management team, as measured by ICOBench, is positively and
significantly associated with market performance and higher gross
proceeds. 4 68 Additionally, Boreiko and Vidusso found that ICOBench
and ICOHolder ratings predict success, but ICOBazaar and ICOMarks
46 9
do not, suggesting inconsistency across different rating sites.

462. Lee et al., supra note 18, at 16.
463. Id. at 27.
464. Independent analysts' ratings seem to predict IPOs success, and thus it is not
surprising that it predicts ICO success. See, e.g., Brad M. Barber et al., Comparing the
Stock Recommendation Performance of Investment Banks and Independent Research
Firms, 85 J. FIN. EcON. 490 (2007) (comparing the profitability of security
recommendations issued by investment banks and independent research firms
andfinding that the buy recommendations of independent research firms outperform
those of investment banks).
465. See Lee et al., supra note 18, at 3-5 (finding that higher ratings for an ICO
have a positive correlation with the listed factors).
466. See Bourveau et al., supra note 118, at 30-33 (finding that higher ratings
correlate positively with the rate of ICO success as well as positive long-term outcomes).
467. See Rhue, supranote 9, at 16, 22 (stating the results of the studies on the ICO
Drops scores, which correlated with greater return on investment, and Etherscan scores,
which correlated to higher market capitalization).
468. See Momtaz, Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 106, at 18-21, 24-25 (finding
that management quality is a strong predictor of ICO success).
469. See Boreiko & Vidusso, supra note 204, at 19. These findings are consistent
with Rhue, supra note 9, at 21-24 (noting the inconsistencies in the information
reputation score systems provide to investors as well as their unreliability as predictors
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Additionally, they show that the frequency of being included in a rating
platform predict
success. 470 David Florysiak and Alexander
Schandlbauer found that ICOBench rating is positively and
significantly predicts ICO success. 47 1
While rating sites potentially may reduce information asymmetry,
recent research suggests that they generally provide low-quality data
and that it is not uncommon for fraudulent ICOs to appear in such

websites, due to their business model, according to which issuers are
paying to the rating sites in exchange for the rating (which also
suggests that they are not independent). 4 72 This is consistent with

recent blog posts that have showed that ICO aggregators simply sell
the rating scores (i.e., the number of stars that the "expert" analysts
would give to the ICO) without conducting serious due diligence. 473 If
these accusations are true, this may indicate that the reputational
concerns in the market are not strong enough, as some scholars have
suggested.

Additionally, empirical studies suggest that their indicators are
not entirely reliable. For example, Bourveau et al. found a strong
relationship between an informative white paper, a dummy variable
measured by ICOBench, and ICO success, 474 but when they manually
analyzed the association between disclosure practices (ICO team
information, token allocation information, founder tokens vesting

of ICO success) and Lyandres et al., supra note 9, at 19-23 (finding that several variables
had differing effects on ICO success).
470. See Boreiko & Vidusso, supra note 204, at 8-9 (finding that the frequency of
an ICO's inclusion on a rating platform has a positive correlation with fundraising
success).

471. See Florysiak & Schandlbauer, supra note 142, at 29 (finding that there is a
positive correlation between an ICO's average rating and its statistical likelihood of
success).

472. See Boreiko & Vidusso, supra note 204, at 5 (stating that it is not uncommon
for ratings lists to include, among other things, data of poor quality and fraudulent ICOs,
leading to the opinion that they are of dubious value to investors seeking reliable
information).
473. See, e.g., Markus Hartmann, This Is How Easy It Is to Buy ICO Ratings - An
Investigation, MEDIUM (June 14, 2018), medium.com/alethena/this-is-how-easy-it-is-tobuy-ico-ratings-an-investigation-13d07e987394 [https://perma.cc/9P7R-78XM] (archived
Nov. 6, 2019) (reporting the results of an experiment that revealed ICOs could pay more
money in order to receive higher ratings and visibility) ; Filip Poutintsev, Beware of ICO
Bench!, HACKERNOON (May 29, 2018), https://hackernoon.comfbeware-of-ico-bench97addacfedc7 [https://perma.cc/YA6M-VUTT] (archived Nov. 5, 2019) (alleging that
ICOBench's rating bot simply assigns ratings based on the promotional package an ICO
buys, and that human ratings experts are easily bribed into giving higher ratings); see
also Cohney et al., supra note 26, at 649 (acknowledging widespread reports of ICO
ratings websites' practice of accepting payment for better ratings).
474. See Bourveau et al., supra note 118, at 19 (finding that white paper length
(which indicates the amount of information in the white paper) has a strong positive
relationship with variables indicative of ICO success).
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period, use of proceeds, white paper opacity, and white paper length)
4 75
This is
and ICO success, they found no significant association.
consistent with Florysiak and Schandlbauer's findings that expert
analysts rely on "easy-to-extract publicly available information such as
team size or the number of social media channels," and hence their
476
rating is uninformative.
Most importantly, empirical studies suggest that rating sites very
often do not provide any information regarding the technical aspects of
the project, or more specifically, regarding the source code of the
project. 4 77 Cohney et al., for example, found that only one of the top five
rating sites by Alexa ranking posts code information. 478 Similarly,
Markus Hartmann et al. have analyzed twenty-eight websites that
offered ICO evaluations and found that "technical information
regarding the underlying blockchain infrastructure that a startup
project builds upon is not covered by any of the identified evaluation

websites." 479 As the source code, the de facto business model of the
project, plays a vital role in the ICO mechanism, we would expect a
different result.
Last, on top of the drawbacks outlined above, most rating sites are
not transparent with regard to their evaluation process. Hartmann et

al. found that only six of the twenty-eight websites that offered ICO
48 0
evaluations provided information about their evaluation process.
These findings are particularly important due to the accusations that
ICO rating sites sell their rating scores without conducting due

diligence.
C. Moral Hazard
Along with the severe information asymmetry, recent studies
have observed moral hazard in ICOs. Moral hazard is a condition
associated with information asymmetry where "transacting parties
share risk, and one party bears the cost of risk taken by another
party." 4 81 This condition has been previously observed in the context of

475. See id. at 19-20, 44 (demonstrating that the listed variables lack any strong
association with predicting ICO success).
476. Florysiak & Schandlbauer, supra note 142, at 6 n.3.
477. See Cohney et al., supra note 26, at 642-43 (assessing the rate at which
ratings websites post information about an ICO's source code, as well as looking at its
prevalence in writings regarding retail valuation); Felix Hartmann et al., Evaluationof
Initial Cryptoasset Offerings: The State of the Practice, 1 2018 INT'L WORKSHOP ON
BLOCKCHAIN ORIENTED SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 33,36 (2018) (analyzing the prevalence

of technical information within ICOs' disclosures).
478. Cohney et al., supra note 26, at 642-43.
479. Hartmann et al.,, supra note 477, at 36.
480. Id. at 37.
481. See Moral Hazard, supra note 11, at 11 (defining moral hazard).
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IPOs. 4 82 In IPOs, moral hazard occurs when founders attract private
or public capital and face a conflict of interests: on the one hand, they
are interested in acquiring growth capital in the long-term, but on the
other hand they are interested in an exit strategy in the short term. 4 83

Hurt argues that "the sheer amount of personal wealth that could be
manipulated from an IPO is very tempting and may take priority over
raising the most capital for the long-term goals of the company." 4 84
In the context of ICO, moral hazard exists in a way that ventures
are incentivized to implement an opportunistic behavior and exploit
the outlined informational asymmetries to signal quality during the
ICO, thus raising more funds, but having lower returns on the longterm. Cohney et al., for example, found that issuers exploit investors'
lack of technological expertise, showing that of the thirty-seven ICOs

that promised a lock-up mechanism, 78 percent didn't code it; and of

-

the thirty-two ICOs that promised supply restrictions, only 76 percent
coded it. 485 However, they also found that the information asymmetry
decreases over time and investors are learning about the true quality
of the source code. 4 86 This suggests that opportunistic behavior has a
positive effect on ICO success-as previously discussed, disclosure
about lock-up mechanisms and token supply restrictions are associated .h
with ICO success-but negative long-term consequences. Similarly,
empirical evidence shows that issuers tend to exaggerate information
disclosed in white papers, and that exaggerating information in white
papers is associated with raising more funds in less time. However,
exaggerating information was also found to be associated with lower
market returns and with a higher initial price volatility that decreases
over time. 4 87
Given the informational asymmetries associated with the market
and the potential benefit of exploiting these
informational
asymmetries, issuers are facing a dilemma: on the one hand, an
opportunistic behavior has negative long-term consequences, but, on

482. See Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, 26
CARDoZo L. REV. 711, 720-61 (2005) (assessing the risks of moral hazard found in the
IPO context).
483. See id. at 721-22 (describing the potential moral hazard issues that can arise
between founders and IPO issuers).
484. Id at 722.
485. See Cohney et al., supra note 26 at 636-38 (analyzing the results of audits of
tokens promising either lock-up mechanisms or supply restrictions).
486. See id. at 655-56 (noting that the involvement of "smart money" actors in the
ICO market can help alleviate information asymmetry issues by paying attention to the
technical side of source code disclosures and making sure issuers follow through on
promises when they fail to code them).
487. See Moral Hazard, supra note 11, at 29-30, 34 (reporting the effects of white
paper exaggeration on the above-mentioned outcomes).
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488
The amount
the other hand, it has a positive effect on ICO success.
raised in an ICO is particularly important because of network effect
and because early liquidity is an important signal for investors in the

489
Therefore, it is possible
absence of measures of commercial success.

that resisting opportunistic behavior from issuers' perspective might
be inefficient (i.e., that low-quality ICOs with misleading and
exaggerated information disclosed in white papers may outperform
4 90
high-quality ICOs that resist opportunistic behavior).

V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

The previous Parts outlined three sources of informational
asymmetries and showed that signaling theory and rating websites are
not entirely effective in mitigating these asymmetries. These findings
suggest that ICO investors are not entirely rational, and that we
cannot fully rely on the competitive forces of an economy in this case.
Therefore, the Article argues that regulators should address the
sources of informational asymmetries discussed in this Article-which
are a source of investors irrationality-by adopting mandatory
disclosure provisions. Against that background, this Part discusses the
question of how regulators can mitigate the information asymmetry
associated with the market by imposing specific disclosure
requirements. More specifically, it focuses on tokens that are de facto
securities and examines how regulators can adjust the prospectus
requirements to the unique characteristics of ICOs.
The traditional IPO disclosure requirements are not well suited
4 91
First, the costs associated with an
for ICOs for a threefold reason.
IPO prospectus are high relative to the total capital raised in ICO and
492
The analysis
may thus constitute a barrier to market development.
in Part III suggests that the funds raised range from $13 million to $16
million, which is typically higher than the amount of funds raised in a
traditional crowdfunding, but lower than the amount raised in an IPO.
Therefore, ICOs generally do not fall within the current exemptions in
securities regulation, and have to spend a relatively large amount of

488. Id. at 36.
489. See Howell et al., supra note 89, at 25 ("From the perspective of an early stage
investor, liquidity is a central benefit of ICOs relative to conventional financing
instruments."); Momtaz, Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 106, at 14 (recognizing the
importance of early liquidity as an incentive for early investors, which subsequently
bolsters network effects).
490. Moral Hazard, supra note 11, at 36.
491. The discussion here relies on Lars Kldhn et al., Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs)
Economics and Regulation 35-38 (Nov. 26, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
Soc. Sci. Research Network) (assessing and rejecting the arguments against applying
IPO prospectus requirements to ICOs).
492. See id. at 35-36 (discussing why prospectus costs would not be prohibitive for
most ICOs).
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funds in an early stage to comply with the prospectus requirements. 4 93

It should be noted, however, that the majority of ICOs conduct presales
and can use the capital raised during these rounds to cover these costs,

at least partially.
Second, ICO investors will not benefit from the prospectus as
much as IPO investors do. To begin with, most ICOs are launched at
the idea stage, and hence can provide only a little amount of useful
information. 494 Additionally, ICO investors are not entirely rational.
As shown in Parts III-IV, disclosure requirements intended to protect
investors that predict success in IPOs-such as information about the
use of proceeds and about the risk and regulation associated with the
project-do not predict success in ICOs (results are mixed). Finally,
some of the information required under the prospectus rules is
irrelevant in the assessment of ICOs, due to their unique technological
nature.
Third, the prospectus requirement "is based on the idea that
professional investors read the prospectus, value the security on that
basis and influence the offering price through the book building
process." 495 This rationale, however, does not apply to ICOs, in which
the tokens are generally offered at a fixed price. 496
Combined,
the
arguments
outlined
above
suggest
an
incompatibility between ICO and IPO prospectus requirements; the
costs associated with an IPO prospectus are high relative to the total
capital raised in ICO (and potentially may pose a barrier to market
development), and the effectiveness of the prospectus requirement in
mitigating information asymmetries is low, compared to the case of
IPOs. These arguments, however, are not necessarily justifying an
exemption from the prospectus requirement. As shown in Parts III-IV,
the competitive forces of an economy are not well-suited to address the
market inefficiencies in the case of ICOs. Instead, the Article suggests

that the prospectus requirements will be adjusted to better fit the
unique characteristics of ICOs and proposes four specific disclosure
requirements that should be imposed. 497

493. Against that background, Rohr & Wright argue that a registration exemption
should be designed for tokens that are in fact securities. See Rohr & Wright, supra note
27, at 522-23.
494. Klohn et al., supra note 491, at 36.
495. Id. at 37.
496. See id. (presenting this line of thought as an argument against the prospectus
requirement).
497. For additional requirements, see id. at 38 ("What rights does the token
convey? . . . On which exchanges will the token be tradable? How exactly does the
(decentralized) business model work? What factors determine the network effects? Why
have no similar networks been created so far? Are there any competitors in the market?
What is the regulatory environment like? What experience do the mostly very young
founders have? Which blockchain technology is the basis for the network? Which
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First, most ICOs are launched by a blockchain-based venture and,
accordingly, there should be a focus on the technological aspects of the
project. On that manner, Hacker and Thomale have suggested that
companies that launch ICOs should be required "to publish the code
underlying the blockchain-based vehicle and the token sale at least one
4 98
The underlying code of a
month in advance of the token sale."
venture is the de facto business model of the project, and hence it is
essential information required to make an informed decision. However,
a requirement to publish the source code prior to the token sale could
be problematic for a twofold reason. First, this requirement will not be
effective unless the code will be audited by a reliable intermediary. The
analysis presented in this Article suggests that while disclosing the
source code significantly predicts success, the number of mismatches
between promises made in white papers and the actual code does not
affect ICO success. These results imply that investors value the
disclosure of the source code but are unable to assess its true quality.
Therefore, the focus here should not be on the requirement to disclose
the source code-which the majority of ICOs disclose voluntarily
anyway-but on an intermediary that will audit the source code.
Second, by disclosing the source code, ICOs enable other ventures to
imitate their technology, and therefore may lose their competitive
advantage. In line with this, Bourveau et al. found a positive and
significant association between source code disclosure and crash risks
in the long term. 4 99 This point should be considered as well when
discussing source code disclosure.
Second, the Article proposes to include a requirement to disclose
information about the existence of presale rounds and their terms. The
first justification for this requirement is to prevent ventures from
maintaining pump-and-dump scams. Rational investors who are
exposed to information regarding the presales, would price this
information and demand a lower price, or alternatively, the
implementation of lock-up mechanisms. The second justification for
this requirement is semantic, and it stipulates that the term "initial
coin offerings" can be misleading if the token sale event is not the first
offering.
Third, the Article proposes to include a disclosure requirement in
relation to the ability to create new tokens after the launch of the ICO.
Catalini and Gans theorize that in order to maximize the amount
raised in a token sale, an ICO should have a predetermined token
supply, 500 and empirical evidence suggests that the ability to create

technological risks exist? Have the relevant smart contracts been audited and, if so, by
whom?").
498. Hacker & Thomale, supra note 57, at 42.
499. See Bourveau et al., supra note 118, at 44 (reporting data that show the abovementioned relationship).
500. See Catalini & Gans, supra note 104, at 2-31 (explaining why ICOs should
limit the supply of tokens available at the outset of the project).
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future tokens is negatively associated with the amount raised in an
ICO. These results suggest the investors are able to price this type of
information, and hence such a requirement will be effective.
Fourth, the Article suggests that ventures should explain in their

prospectus why blockchain technology is required for their project.
Empirical studies support this suggestion showing that most ICOs do
not need blockchain, but yet use it to attract investors driven by hype,
and that investors are able to distinguish between ICOs that leverage
blockchain technology and ICOs that do not really need to use

blockchain. 50 1 In order for this requirement to be effective, the Article
further suggests that a structured methodology to determine whether
blockchain is the appropriate technical solution will be developed.5 0 2
Another area for considerations is the role of rating websites as an
information intermediary. While rating scores from rating websites
strongly predict successful fundraising, they are generally providing
low-quality data. Most of the rating websites do not provide any

information regarding the technical aspects of the project, and some of

.

them have been accused of selling their rating scores without
conducting due diligence. These findings may indicate that the
reputational concerns in the market are not strong enough, or
alternatively, that investors are unable to assess the quality of these
evaluations due to lack of fundamental knowledge about this
innovative industry.

Although a more in-depth analysis of ICO rating websites is
required in order to propose conclusive policy suggestions, these
findings suggest that, in the current state of the market, rating
websites are a source of market inefficiency; the quality of their ratings
is typically low, they do not provide any information regarding the
technical aspects of the project, and yet their rating scores are strongly
associated with ICO success indicators. Therefore, the Article argues
that regulators should pay close attention to these rating websites and
focus on the (lack of) transparency with regard to their evaluation
process. 503

501. See, e.g., Feng et al., supra note 221, at 25-26 (discussing data that points to
the use of blockchain being important to investors regardless of whether the ICO actually
needs to use it or not).
502. On that matter, see Karl Wist & Arthur Gervais, Do you need a Blockchain?,
2018 CRYPTO VALLEY CONFERENcE ON BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY 45, 45-53 (2018)
(espousing a structured methodology for determining whether a particular project
requires the use of a blockchain); Morgen E. Peck, Blockchain world - Do you need a
blockchain? This chart will tell you if the technology can solve your problem, 54 IEEE
SPECTRUM 38, 38-39, 60 (2017) (providing a less technical explanation of a structured
methodology to determine the utility of a blockchain for a project).
503. For a similar suggestion, see Hartmann et al., supra note 477, at 37
(acknowledging the transparency of an ICO evaluation process as a critical factor in
determining whether that process is reliable).
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To conclude, this Article reviewed empirical studies on the
characteristics of ICO and determinants of ICO success, compared
their findings with studies in the context of IPOs and crowdfunding,
and offered theoretical explanations. By comparing determinants of

ICO

success

with

determinants

of IPOs'

success,

the Article

contributed to the literature on the classification of tokens as
securities, as it showed the circumstances in which ICO investors and
initiators behave like IPO investors and initiators.
The Article also provided another perspective for the discussion
on ICO regulation, by analyzing informational asymmetries associated
with ICOs. It found strong evidence for information asymmetry: ICO
investors are given so little information and thus their investment
decision cannot be based on completely rational grounds. In addition,

the Article outlined three sources for these asymmetries-the absence
of standard disclosure requirements, investors' lack of fundamental
technical knowledge, and projects' early stages of development during
the offering-and discussed the role of signaling theory and rating
websites in mitigating these asymmetries.
It showed that the effectiveness of signaling in mitigating these
asymmetries is limited; ventures that voluntarily disclosed more
extensive information in their white papers were not necessarily more
successful. Additionally, the Article showed that while independent
analysts play a vital intermediary role, and their rating scores are
associated with success indicators, their ratings are generally low
quality, inaccurate, and do not include any information regarding the
technical aspects of the project. Hence, the Article claimed that the

effectiveness of ICO rating websites in mitigating the information
asymmetry associated with the market is limited as well.
In many cases, the competitive forces of an economy can be relied
on to drive abnormal returns in financial markets back down to
marginal cost. The analysis presented in this Article suggests that
ICOs are not one of those cases. Instead, regulators should address the
sources of informational asymmetries discussed in this Article-which
are a source of investors' irrationality-by mandatory disclosure
provisions. To this end, the Article developed four specific disclosure
requirements tailored to the unique characteristics of ICOs.

VI. APPENDIX

A. Table 1-EmpiricalPapers
Table 1 presents selected empirical papers. For each paper, it
reports the objective of the empirical analysis, the variables used to
measure success, sample period, sample size, secondary market

&

sample size, success rate, and sources. The papers presented are as
follows: A&S = Amsden & Schweizer; A,G&M = Adhami, Giudici
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&

Martinazzi; B = Bourveau et al.; Blaseg; B&K = Benedetti
Kostovetsky; B&M = Burns & Moro; C,H,S&W = Cohney, Hoffman,
Sklarof & Wishnick; C,G,R&W = Chanson, Gjoen, Risius & Wortmann;
D,M&S = Drobetz, Momtaz & Schr6der; D,R&V = De Jong,
Roosenboom & van der Kolk; EY = Ernst & Young; F = Feng et al.;
Fisch; Felix; H,M&V = Huang, Meoli & Vismara; H,N&Y = Howell,
Niessner & Yermack; L,L&S = Lee, Li & Shin; L,P&R = Lyandres,
Palazzo & Rabetti; M = Momtaz; R = Rhue; Z = Zetzsche et al. The
variables used to measure success are divided into two categories.
First, variables related to token tradability: 1. Listed: a dummy
variable that equals 1 if the related token is traded on an exchange,
and 0 otherwise. 2. Listed on CMC (A&S; B&K): a dummy variable that
equals 1 if the related token is listed as traded on CoinMarketCap.com,
and 0 otherwise. 3. Liquidity (H,N&Y): based on a standard illiquidity

measure that has been developed by Amihud. 504 Second, variables
related to the amount raised in the ICO: 1. Amount Raised: natural
logarithm of amount raised in the ICO in USD. 2. Raised Soft Cap: a
dummy variable that equals 1 if the ICO reached its fundraising goal,
and 0 otherwise. 3. Raised Capital (B&K): a dummy variable that
equals 1 for all ICOs that raised capital, and 0 otherwise. 4. Raised
Dummy (L,P&R): a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ICO raised
more than 5% of hard cap or more than $10,000 if hard cap is missing,
and 0 otherwise.
Paper

Objecti
Voe

Success
Measur

Sample
Period

Sample

Second

Success

Size

ary

Rate

es

Sources

Market
Sample

A&S
(2018)

Determ
inants
of ICO
success.

Token
Tradabi
lity
(Listed)
and
Amoun

20152018

1009

363

42%
(36%
505)

ICObenc
h.com
and
Cryptosl
ate.com.
Crosschecked

504. See Yakov Amihud, Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time-series
effects, 5 J. FIN. MKT. 31, 34, 37 (2002) (describing Professor Amihud's illiquidity
measure); Yakov Amihud et al., Liquidity and Asset Prices, 1 FOUND. & TRENDS FIN. 269,
313 (2006) (discussing Professor Amihud's illiquidity measure among other techniques).
505. Forty-two percent of tokens in the sample are traded on an exchange, but only
thirty-six percent are listed as traded on CoinMarketCap.com. Amsden & Schweizer,
supra note 188, at 32; see also All Cryptocurrencies, COINMARKETCAP,
7,
2019)
visited
Nov.
(last
https://coinmarketcap.com/all/views/all/
[https://perma.cc/2G8B-BHBL] (archived Nov. 6, 2019) (listing all cryptocurrencies
traded on exchanges) [hereinafter COINMARKETCAP].

596

[voL. 53:525

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

informat
ion with

t
Raised

CoinSch
edule.co
m,

CoinMar
ketCap.c
om,
TokenDa
tado,
and

8)

Determ

Raised

inants
of ICO
success.

Soft
Cap

4

-I-

4

A,G&
M(201

20142017

CoinMar
ketPlus.c
om.

253

253

81%

TokenDa
ta.io,
CoinMar
ketCap.c
om,
CoinSch
edule.co
m,

CoinDes
k.com,
ICOAler
t.com,
ICOBaza
ar.com,
TokenM
arket.net
,and
SmithAn
dCrown.
com.
B
(2018)

2014-

776506

659

85%

CoinMar

Determ
inants

Raised
Soft

of ICO
success,
crash
risks,

Cap
and

om,
CoinDes

Amoun
t

k.com,
TokenDa

and
market

Raised

ta.io,
CoinSch

returns

2018

ketCap.c

edule.co
m,

506. Out of which 659 have successfully completed an ICO (i.e., the soft cap was
reached). Bourveau et al., supra note 118.
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507. The amount raised in million US dollars. Blaseg, supra note 229, at 28.
508. Sixty-one percent of ICOs raised capital during the ICO and twenty-nine
percent of ICOs have listed their tokens. Id. at 12-13.
509. Twenty-six percent of ICOs have listed their tokens. Benedetti
Kostovetsky, supra note 115, at 15.
510. 146 ICOs that ended between June 2017 and November 2017 and which were
trading for a minimum of four months from the first day of trading. Burns & Moro, supra
note 243, at 10.
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511. Whether project's website is online (in July 2018) and whether the project was
active on Twitter and GitHub between May and July 2018. De Jong et al., supra note
243, at 12-13.
512. Twenty-nine percent of the ICOs in the sample have soft cap. Of those, fortysix percent manage to raise more capital than the minimum target amount. Id. at 12.
513. Fifty percent of tokens in the sample are listed as traded on
CoinMarketCap.com. Id.; see also COINMARKETCAP, supra note 505 (listing tokens
traded on exchanges).
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as of April 11, 2018. Howell et al., supra note 89, at 21-22; see also COINMARKETCAP,
supra note 505 (aggregating tokens traded on exchanges).
516. Only sixty-one percent (276) of ICOs have disclosed a fundraising goal. Of
those, fifty-three percent failed to reach their fundraising goal. Therefore, only thirtyone percent of the total samples reached their fundraising goal. See Howell et al., supra
note 89, at 25 (discussing the percentage of ICOs that disclose fundraising goals and the
proportion that failed to reach theirs).
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517. Or if the ICO raised more than $0.5 million in the absence of a soft cap. Lee
et al., supra note 18, at 1-2.
518. Forty-five percent the ICOs raised more than five percent of the hard cap or,
if the hard cap is missing, more than $10,000 (only twenty-six percent of ICOs reach the
hard cap). Thirty-nine percent of ICOs have listed their tokens. Lyandres et al., supra
note 9, at 16.
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519. Measured as the total funding amount raised through the ICO (not logged).
Momtaz, Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 106, at 37.
520. Twenty-one percent of ICOs have failed-i.e., have been delisted at least at
some exchange. Id. at 18.
521. She uses a sample of 435 ICOs, out of which 357 ICOs were completed. See
Rhue, supra note 8, at 32 (including a table that demonstrates, among other things, the
number of completed ICOs out of the data set).
522. A sample of coins and tokens that has been listed on CoinMarketCap. The
sample is restricted to (1) currencies that were launched after January 1, 2017 to exclude
established cryptocurrencies; and (2) currencies that have at least three months of data
as of March 31, 2018. Id. at 16; see also COINMARKETCAP, supra note 505 (listing all
cryptocurrencies listed on exchanges).
523. Over 1000. According to the authors, the database is being continuously
updated. See Zetzsche et al., supra note 82, at 5 (drawing from a "rapidly growing"
database of ICOs).
524. 18.7 percent of the ICOs in the sample have failed to reach their fundraising
goal, while 8.25 percent managed to reach the goal. For 68.15 percent of the sample, they
lack reliable information on the subscription status. Id. at 15 n.31.
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B. Table 2-Determinantsof ICO Success
Table 2 summarizes empirical findings for selected variables. It

presents the association between ICO success and the following
variables. 1. WP Disclosure: a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ICO
disclosed a white paper, and 0 otherwise. 2. WP Quality: proxies of
white paper quality vary in the literature and include white paper
length (A&S; B; Fisch), whether the ICO has an informative white
paper (B), and number of unique words in the white paper (L,P&R;
Blaseg; F). 3. SC Disclosure: a dummy variable that equals 1 if an ICO
published its source code in an online repository such as Github, and 0
otherwise. 4. Team Size: the natural logarithm of the number of team
members (B); the number of team members (M; A&S; D,R&V); the
number of team members squared (B&M); or a variable equals 1 if

founding team size is disclosed, and 0 otherwise (F). 5. Use of Proceeds:
a dummy variable that equals 1 if information about the use of

proceeds is disclosed, and 0 otherwise. 6. Presale: a dummy variable
that equals 1 if the ICO had a presale, and 0 otherwise (A&S; B&K;
H,N&Y; Fisch; M; L,L&S); or a dummy variable that equals 1 if the
ICO has information about the amount raised in a presale (L,P&R). 7.
Preregistering/KYC: a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ICO's
investors are required to provide information to confirm their identity

(KYC) or to register in order to participate (whitelist). 8. Bonus: a
dummy variable that equals 1 if the ICO offers a bonus before the ICO,
and 0 otherwise; or a dummy variable that equals 1 if an ICO offers a

bonus over 20%, and 0 otherwise (L,L&S). Note that some authors
provide different variables to bonuses offered during the ICO and
bonuses given during the pre-ICO (e.g., A&S). 9. Ethereum Blockchain:

a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ICO is on the Ethereum
platform, and 0 otherwise. 10. Utility token: definitions for utility

tokens vary in the literature. Consequently, the table reports the
variable used in each paper. A,G&M use a variable that equals 1 if the
token can be used to access or pay for services, and 0 otherwise; Fisch
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uses a variable that equals 1 if an ICO highlights the utility of its
token, and 0 otherwise. H,N&Y use a variable that equals 1 if the
related token represents the right to access a service that the issuer
will provide through a new network, and 0 otherwise. 11. Lock-up
Mechanism: a dummy variable that equals 1 if information about lockup mechanism is disclosed in the white paper, and 0 otherwise. 12.
Token Total Supply: the natural logarithm of the total amount of
tokens. 13. Fraction of Tokens Sold: percentage of tokens distributed
in the ICO. 14. ICO Duration:the duration of the ICO in days; or the
announced number of days for which an ICO accepts funding (Blaseg).
15. Soft Cap /FundraisingGoal: a dummy variable that equals 1 if the
ICO has a soft cap/fundraising goal, and 0 otherwise. 16. Accepting
Ether: a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ICO accepts Ether, and 0
otherwise 17. Accepting Bitcoin: a dummy variable that equals 1 if the
ICO accepts Bitcoin, and 0 otherwise. 18. Accepting USD/Fiat: a
dummy variable that equals 1 if the ICO accepts USD, and 0 otherwise
(H,N&Y; R); or a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ICO accepts any
fiat currency, and 0 otherwise (A&S; M;) 19. Has Country restriction:a
dummy variable that equals 1 if the ICO is restricted in certain
countries, and 0 otherwise (L,L&S). 20. US Restriction: a dummy
variable that equals 1 if US citizens were from the ICO, and 0
otherwise.

Variable

+

Disclosure Practices

WP Disclosure
WP Quality

CS Disclosure

Team Size
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_______

H,N&Y (2018)

B
(

(2018)

A&S (2018); B
(2018)525; Fisch (2019);
L,P&R (2018);
F(2019)5 26
A&S (2018); A,G&M
(2018); B (2018);
H,N&Y (2018); D,R&V
(2018)
A&S (2018); B (2018);
B&M (2018); L,P&R

AG&M
2018
(2018)

Blaseg
(2018)527

Fisch (2019)

F(2019)

(2018); D,R&V (2018)
Use of
Poed
fH,N&Y (2018)
Proceeds

Presale

Preregistering/
KYC
Bonus

F(2019)

B (2018)

A,G&M (2018);
H,N&Y (2018); Fisch
(2019); L,P&R (2018);
L,L&S (2018)528;
D,R&V (2018)
B&M (2018); L,P&R
(2018)

A&8
M
'

B&K (2018)

L,L&S
(2018)
L,L&S
(2018)

A&S (2018);
Blaseg (2018
A,G&M
(2018); A&S

529.

(21)A&

525. See Bourveau et al., supra note 118, at 18-20, 44 (finding that white paper
length and informative white paper (a dummy variable according to ICOBench) reliably
predicts ICO success, but when manually analyzing the association between disclosure
practices (ICO team information, token allocation information, founder tokens vesting
period, use of proceeds, white paper opacity, and white paper length) and ICO success,
finding no significant association).
526. The coefficient is significant in most specifications. Feng et al., supra note
221, at 27.
527. The number of words in a white paper is not associated with the amount
raised, but significantly and positively associated with token tradability. See Blaseg,
supra note 229, at 31-32 (displaying tables that show the number of words in a white
paper have little effect on funding amounts raised, but significantly affect whether the
token gets listed on an exchange).
528. See Lee et al., supra note 18, at 19, 43 (finding that the existence of presales
increases the success likelihood, but that presales are negatively related to the amount
raised).
529. See id. at 40 (using an indicator that equals 1 if an ICO offers a bonus over
twenty percent (equivalent to a discount of 16.7 percent), and 0 otherwise).
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(2018)531; B
(2018); Blaseg
2018

Blockchain and Token Type
Ethereum
hain
Block
Blccan

H,N&Y (2018); M
(2019);
(2018); Fisch
(2018)532
D,R&V

Utility Token

AG&M (2018);

___________H,N&Y

A&S
(2018)
533

B&M
(2018)
(08

Fisch (2019)

(2018)I

Economic Variables
B (2018); H,N&Y
Lockup
(2018); Blaseg (2018);
Mechanism
F (2019)
A&S (2018); B&K
Token Total
(2018); Fisch (2019);
Supply
DR&V (2018)

Fraction of
Tokens Sold

ICO Duration

A&S
(2018);
L,P&R
(2018);

H,N&Y
(2018); Fisch
(2019);
D,R&V

L,L&S

(2018)535.

(2018)
Fisch
(2019);
M
(2018);
L,L&S
(2018)

Blaseg (2018)

H,N&Y
(2018)

536.

D,R&V

530. See De Jong et al., supra note 243, at 16-17 (finding that not having a bonus
scheme is associated with ICO success).
531. See Amsden & Schweizer, supra note 188, at 21 (finding, to the contrary, that
offering a bonus during the ICO is significantly and positively associated with ICO
success).

532. See De Jong et al., supra note 243, at 30 (finding that the variable Ethereum
Platform is positively and significantly associated with the amount raised, but
insignificantly associated with token tradability).
533. See Amsden & Schweizer, supra note 188, at 33, 37 (finding that the variable
Ethereum Platform is negatively associated with the amount raised in an ICO, but
positively associated with token tradability).
534. See Burns & Moro, supra note 243, at 22, 29 (also finding that the variable
Ethereum Platform is negatively associated with first-day returns).
535. See De Jong et al., supra note 243, at 3, 17-18 (finding that the percentage of
tokens retained by the project is significantly and positively associated with expost
success measures, but is insignificantly associated with fundraising success).
536. See Lee et al., supra note 18, at 18 (finding that failed ICOs are longer than
successful ICO, with the difference being significant (p<0.1)).
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(2018);
Blaseg
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Soft
.o.tA&S (2018); H,N&Y
Cap/Fundraisi
(2018); Fisch (2019)
ng Goal

B
(2018)

9<

The Token Sale Event
Accepting
H,N&Y (2018); R
Ether
(2018)
Accepting
H,N&Y (2018); R
Bitcoin
(2018)
Accepting
USD/Fiat

M (2018); D,R&V
(2018)538

Has Country
Restriction

US Restriction

A&S
(2018)
539

HN&Y
(2018); R
2018
(2018)

L,L&S

A&S (2018)

M
(2018)

HN&Y
(2018)

539

(2018)

B (2018)

L,L&S
(2018)*537; R
(2018); Blaseg
(2018)

C. Table 3-Success and FailureRates
Table 3 presents ICOs' success and failure rates. For each paper,

it reports the indicator used to measure success, success rate, the
indicator used to measure failure, failure rate, and sample period and

size. Measures of success: 1. Listed: a dummy variable that equals 1 if
the related token is traded on an exchange, and 0 otherwise. 2. Listed
on CMC (A&S): a dummy variable that equals 1 if the related token is
listed as traded on CoinMarketCap.com, and 0 otherwise. 3. Raised
Soft Cap: a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ICO reached its
fundraising goal, and 0 otherwise. 4. Raised capital (B&K): a dummy
variable that equals 1 for all ICOs that raised capital, and 0 otherwise.
5. Raised dummy (L,P&R): a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ICO
raised more than 5% of hard cap or more than $10,000 if hard cap is
missing, and 0 otherwise. 6. Raised to Hard Cap (L,P&R): "The ratio of
the amount raised in the ICO to the hardacap." Measures of failure: 1.

537. See id. at 16 (while not analyzing a dummy soft cap variable, stillfinding that
the average soft cap for successful ICOs is nearly identical to that set by unsuccessful
ICOs, with the difference being insignificant).
538. See De Jong et al., supra note 243, at 30 (finding that accepting fiat is
positively and significantly associated with the amount raised, but insignificantly
related to token tradability).
539. See Amsden & Schweizer, supra note 188, at 34 (finding that accepting fiat is
positively associated with the amount raised, but negatively related to token tradability).
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Extreme Negative Return (B): a dummy variable that equals 1 if

cumulative raw returns are less than or equal to -75% at the end of
either the three-month, six-month, or twelve-month period after the

ICO first begins trading on CMC, and 0 otherwise. 2. Delisted: a
dummy variable that equals 1 if the related token was delisted at one
or more exchanges, and 0 otherwise. 3. Project Death (M): a dummy
variable that equals 1 if the related token was delisted at every token
exchange platform, and 0 otherwise. 4. Lost All Their Value (EY): a
dummy variable that equals 1 if the return to ICO investors have
declined by more than 90% (from January 1 to September 2, 2018), and
0 otherwise.
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20201

Success

Success

Failure

Failure

Measure

bate

Measure

Rate

Period

Comments

_Size)

Listed

2 ICO occurred in

42%
20152018
(1,009)

A&S
(2018)

M(201
8)

Listed
on CMC

Raised
Soft Cap

Raised

36%

Raise
81%

2017
(253)

B
(2018)

Extreme
Ne
e
Negative

Return(

26%

B&K
(2018)

on CMC

2018
(569)

months of
trading data as of
May, 2018

48%

20132018

26%

(2,390)
Lost All
Their
Value (-

30% of ICOs have
declined by more
than 90% from

90%)
EY
(2018)

H,N&
Y

(2018)

30%

Raised
Soft
Cap*

47%
(31%)
540

2015, 33 in 2016,
and 216 in 2017

2014-

75%)
Raised
Capital
Listed

4 ICOs occurred
between 2014-

The secondary
market sample is
restricted to
tokens that have
at least three

20142018
(776)

85%

2015, 16 in 2016,
648 in 2017, and
338 in 2018 (as of
March 2018)

2015-

January 1 to

0
2017
(141)

September 2,
2018.

20132018

The sample is
restricted to
tokens that have

(268)

540. Only sixty-one percent (276) of ICOs have disclosed a fundraising goal. Of
those, fifty-three percent failed to reach their fundraising goal. Therefore, only thirtyone percent of the total sample reached their fundraising goal. Howell et al., supra note
89, at 25 (reporting the percentage of ICOs disclosing fundraising goals and the
percentage of that group failing to reach those goals).
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Delisted

9%

20132018
(453)

L ,L&S
(2018)

L,P&
R
(2018)

at least three
months of
trading data on
CMC as of April
11, 2018

2016-

Raised
Soft
Cap541

45.4%

Raised
Dummy

46%

Raised
to Hard
Cap

[VOL.-53:525

2018
(1,549)

46%

20132018
(3,068)

All but 16 ICOs
happened
between 2017-

2013-

2018

2018
(1,200)
2013-

Listed

M
(2018)

2018
(1,516)

38%
Delisted

21%

Project
Death

13%

20152018
(495)
According to the

Failed to
Reach
Z
(2018)

the
Fundrais

18.7%

(1X)

updated

ing
Goa1

authors, the
database is being
continuously

542

D. Table 4-Underpricing
Table 4 displays empirical findings related to underpricing. For
each paper, it reports the indicator used to measure underpricing, the
mean value, the median value, and the number of observations.
Measures of ICO underpricing vary in the literature and include the
following indicators. 1. ICO to Open: The difference between the ICO
price and the first day opening price. 2. ICO to Close: The difference
between the ICO price and the first day closing price. 3. Open to Close:
the difference between the closing and opening price of the first day. 4.
ICO to 5th Close: The difference between the ICO price and the closing
price five days after the token is listed.

541. An "ICO is deemed successful if its soft cap was reached or the project raised
more than $0.5 million in the absence of a soft cap." Lee et al., supra note 18, at 40.
542. For 68.15 percent of the sample, they lack reliable information on the
subscription status. Zetzsche et al., supranote 82, at 15 n.31.
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Paper

Underpricing
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Mean

Median

N~

ICO to Close

919%

24.7%

140

Log Open to Close

14%

6%

659

Log ICO to Close

39%

40%

300

ICO to Open (equal-

179%

-

416543

C(G018W
(2018)

ICO to 5th Close

111%

42.5%

95

(,M&2

Open to Close

14.8%

0.1%

1,403

Felix (2018)

ICO to Close

102%

26%

255

L,L&S
LL&S)
(2018)

ICO to Close

158.2%

24.4%

432

Log ICO to Open

215.7%

14.7%

580

Log Open to Close

11.6%

3.3%

603

Open to Close

8.2%

2.6%

302

Melasure

A,G&M

(2018)

B (2018)

B&K (2018)

C,G,R&W

weighted returns)

L,P&R
(2018)

M (2018)

543. Only ICOs that were listed within sixty days. Benedetti & Kostovetsky, supra
note 115, at 21, 23.
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